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Nuclear power plants are among the most technologically complex of all energy 
facilities.  This complexity reflects the precision needed in design, maintenance and 
operations to harness the energy of the atom safely, reliably and economically.  Nuclear 
energy thus requires consistent, high levels of organizational performance by the highly 
skilled professionals who operate and maintain nuclear power plants (Nuclear Energy 
Institute [NEI], 2014, p. 1). 
A key element for achieving consistent, high levels of performance in a nuclear 
organization is its safety culture.  Nuclear safety culture is for an organization what 
character and personality is for an individual: a feature that is made visible primarily 
through behaviors and espoused values.  Nuclear safety culture is undergoing constant 
change.  It represents the collective behaviors of the organization, which change as the 
organization and its members change and apply themselves to their daily activities.  As 
problems arise, the organization learns from them.  Successes and failures become 
ingrained in the organization’s nuclear safety culture and form the basis on which the 
organization conducts business.  These behaviors are taught to new members of the 
organization as the correct way to perceive, think, act and feel (NEI, 2014, p. 1).  
  
 
Nuclear Safety Culture (NSC) is defined as the core values and behaviors resulting from 
a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing 
goals to ensure protection of people and the environment (Institute of Nuclear Power 
Operations [INPO], 2012a, p. iv).  Thus, nuclear safety culture depends on every 
employee, from the board of directors, to the control room operator, to the field 
technician in the switchyard, to the security officers and to contractors on site.  That is, 
nuclear safety culture is affected by everything we say and everything we do.  Nuclear 
safety is a collective responsibility meaning no one in the organization is exempt from the 
obligation to ensure nuclear safety first (NEI, 2014, p. 1). 
Furthermore, NSC is a leadership responsibility.  Leaders reinforce safety culture 
at every opportunity so that the health of safety culture is not taken for granted.  Leaders 
frequently measure the health of safety culture with a focus on trends rather than absolute 
values.  Leaders communicate what constitutes a healthy safety culture and ensure 
everyone understands his or her role in its promotion.  Leaders recognize that safety 
culture is not all or nothing but is, rather, constantly moving along a continuum.  As a 
result, there is a comfort in discussing safety culture within the organization as well as 
with outside groups, such as regulatory agencies (INPO, 2012a).  That is, NSC like 
everything else rises and falls based on leadership (Maxwell, 1998). 
In order to facilitate a healthy NSC, which is the sine qua non of safe nuclear 
plant operation, the leadership team needs to understand its present health in order to 
address NSC issues.  It has been said “To manage risk, one has first to comprehend it” 
(Gheorghe, 2005, p. xvii).  Equally true, in order to manage the nuclear safety culture of 
an organization we must first comprehend it. 
  
 
The goal of this research is to provide an ongoing holistic, objective, transparent 
and safety-focused process to identify early indications of potential problems linked to 
culture.  The process uses a cross-section of available data (e.g., the corrective action pro- 
gram, performance trends, NRC inspections, industry evaluations, nuclear safety culture 
assessments, self-assessments, audits, operating experience, workforce issues and 
employee concerns program and other process inputs).  These data are then analyzed 
utilizing Multiple-criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) methodology that incorporates 
belief degrees of the management team leading to insights about its meaning which may 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Designed, built, and operated to produce electricity, commercial nuclear power 
plants consist of complex technologies operating in a complex regulatory environment 
(Wells, 2010).  The technical challenges inherent in the design are confronted by 
economic demands, mainly due to changes in the circumstances of the energy industry 
(Itoigawa, Wilpert & Fahlbruch, 2005).  The nuclear power industry has been challenged 
by changing circumstances, including governmental pressures to deregulate energy 
markets, increases in company mergers, organizational cost-saving strategies, and the 
replacement of aging technical components with newer and more costly technologies 
(Itoigawa et al., 2005). Competitive business pressures appear to have been compelling 
the nuclear power industry to improve delivered value and the processes that deliver 
value, which can affect the NSC through increased risk (Gheorghe, 2006). 
Nuclear power is a complex technology for electrical power generation (Wells, 
2010).  Commercial nuclear power plants consist of redundant systems that force a 
nuclear reactor shutdown when temperatures and pressures exceed design basis limits 
(McAvoy & Rosenthal, 2005).  These systems are designed to prevent core damage and 
resultant potential radiological hazards to the surrounding environments.  The technical 
challenges created by a need to ensure safe operations and to prevent the introduction of 
radioactive materials into the external environment have been a necessary element in the 




Researchers have observed that this complex technology is being confronted by 
additional challenges and demands, including increased competitiveness among nuclear 
operating companies, intensified cost-saving strategies, and the replacement of original 
technical components due to natural aging with newer and more costly technologies 
(Itoigawa et al., 2005).  
Although commercial nuclear power plants in the United States (U.S.) historically 
have had a reasonable record of safe operations (Langston, 2005; U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 2009), events in the global nuclear industry have influenced 
conceptualization of nuclear safety cultures.  The industry had its first significant safety 
culture incident in 1979 as a result of an accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power 
Plant in the United States (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 2004).  The importance 
of maintaining strong cultural attributes related to nuclear safety was reinforced after the 
1986 event at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine (International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 1988).  According to industry researchers, one critical factor essential to 
a strong nuclear safety culture was a nuclear business acumen, which included the ability 
to manage the unique interaction of risks from technology, economics, human factors, 
and safety in a changing nuclear business environment (Wilpert & Itoigawa, 2001).   
Furthermore, when applying processes to improve value and control costs, key 
organizational factors could be affected, specifically allocation o f resources and work.  
Corcoran implied that application of improvement processes could affect the nuclear 
power plant's institutions by which the work organizations perform its activities involved 






On April 26, 1986, reactor number four at the Ukrainian Chernobyl Nuclear 
Power Plant exploded resulting in large geographical areas being contaminated, deaths 
and mass relocation of an entire city population.  The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant 
accident provided a watershed event leading to the studies of a nuclear safety culture 
concept.  Researchers developed the concept of a nuclear safety culture in the aftermath 
of this nuclear accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.  However, the industry 
had its first significant safety culture incident in 1979 as a result of the accident at the 
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant in the United States.  The accident was 
caused by a combination of personnel errors, design deficiencies, and component failures.  
In the aftermath of the nuclear accident at the United State (US) Three Mile Island (TMI) 
Nuclear Plant in 1979 there has been controversy as to whether the commercial use of 
nuclear power is safe for the generation of electricity (Gheorghe & Muresan, 2011).  In 
fact, this one nuclear accident resulted in a moratorium on new nuclear plant construction 
for nearly three decades in the United States.  Furthermore, this concern for safety was 
bolstered by the nuclear accident at Russia’s Chernobyl Nuclear Plant in 1986 and again 
recently by the nuclear accidents at the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear multi-plant 
site in 2011 (Gheorghe & Muresan, 2011).  What is not widely known, outside of the 
nuclear industry, is that after the Chernobyl nuclear accident the US nuclear industry 
along with its civilian governance organization (i.e., the Institute for Nuclear Power 
Operation or INPO) and its US government regulator (i.e., Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission or NRC) have worked relentlessly to establish a robust and pervasive 




The NRC defines Nuclear Safety Culture as: “The core values and behaviors 
resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety 
over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment (NRC-2010-
0282, Final Safety Culture Policy Statement, 2011).  It is this Nuclear Safety Culture in 
the US Nuclear Power Plants that has played a significant role in reducing the risk of a 
nuclear accident as demonstrated by zero nuclear accidents in the US subsequent to TMI. 
In order to facilitate a healthy NSC, which is the sine qua non of safe nuclear 
plant operation, the leadership team needs to understand its present health in order to 
address NSC issues.  The volumes of literature on these nuclear accidents; however, has 
dealt almost exclusively with technical, radiological, and environmental issues.  No 
research was located that studied utilized Multiple-Criteria Decision Analysis 
Methodology (MCDA) to determine the health performance of a NSC.  This research will 
be conducted to bridge a gap in knowledge and to supplement the body of knowledge 
with respect to NSC health utilizing a MCDA methodology. 
 
1.3 Purpose 
If an excellent NSC is not maintained, then another nuclear accident might occur 
at a nuclear power plant, utilized for the commercial generation of electricity in the US, 
which could result in the end of the commercial use of nuclear power to generate 
electricity in the US. 
The health of the NSC is a function of our belief and those beliefs can influence 
our understanding.  In addition, our belief may not always agree with the results of our 




the health of the NSC while others seek to exclude degrees of belief altogether by relying 
exclusively on objective data.  Multiple assessments that seek to assess the health 
performance of a NSC in a specific organization could vary widely due to being based on 
tangible data or intangible data (e.g., belief).  
Rather than fault the subjectivity of our degrees of belief of the health 
performance of a NSC, or confuse our objective assessments with personal opinions, it is 
proposed that we integrate our belief as a unique component of NSC health assessments.  
Consequently, a MCDA based process is proposed in this dissertation to systematically 
collect and integrate assessments of NSC in a manner that so that each dimension can be 
explored uniquely, and such that all components can be aggregated into an overall health 
assessment in a systematic, transparent, traceable, and reproducible manner. 
Consequently, the purpose of this research study is to evaluate NSC health as a 
function of belief, quantified as degrees of belief, and tangible inputs integrated with 
MCDA in order to reduce the subjectivity of NSC assessments.  Some assessments rely 
on degrees of belief from subject matter experts (SME) in order to qualify or quantify.  
Others exclude degrees of belief altogether, relying on objective data, if available.  Rather 
than fault the subjectivity of our belief, or dilute objective assessments with personal 
opinions, it is logical to embrace our belief of the health performance of a NSC, but 
isolate and include them as a unique component of the NSC health assessment.  
Again, a MCDA based NSC health assessment methodology is proposed by this 
dissertation to systematically collect and integrate tangible indicators of NSC health 
along with the intangible of our belief.  Combined in a manner that each dimension can 




integrated into an overall Nuclear Safety Culture Health assessment in a consistent and 
reproducible manner (Figure 1).  This NSC health assessment methodology draws from 
the fields of nuclear engineering, systems engineering, and psychology to develop a 
model that integrates the intangible of our belief with the various other tangible inputs 
using Multi-criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA). 
 
 
Figure 1. NSC Assessment with Proposed MCDA Process 
The NSC Assessment with MCDA Process consists of three phases as illustrated 
in Figure 2.  The first phase is the Deterministic Phase where the process inputs are 
evaluated and binned.  The second phase consists of a Qualitative/Quantitative Survey 




assessed.  The final phase is the assessment integration phase, where the binned process 
inputs and the assessment of degrees of belief are both assimilated.  These phases will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. 
 
 
Figure 2. Three Phases of the NSC Assessment with MCDA Process 
The purpose of this research, as illustrated in Figure 3, is three-fold.  First, it is 
necessary to determine how to assess the belief of NSC Health for a given scenario.  We 
are less concerned with the degrees of belief data, itself, or even with which method is 
considered the best way to collect the belief data; rather, we are concerned with 
integrating degrees of belief data with binned Process Input data.  It is assumed that data 
for the Process Inputs and even degrees of belief could be leveraged from previous 
assessments, collected as part of the research, or simulated, if necessary, in order to 
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Figure 3. Research Purpose 
Next, an integrated NSC with MCDA assessment methodology must be 
researched.  The belief is that the currently accepted NSC Assessment methodology of 
simply binning and trending the process inputs is inadequate for characterizing health of 
the NSC and that an integrated model should be explored to incorporate belief into the 
current health assessment approach.  However, precisely how those components of health 
are integrated must be decided.  The improved health assessment integration 
methodology, based on the binned process inputs and degrees of belief assessments, will 
be developed and presented.  This methodology will systematically integrate both 
assessments in a meaningful, traceable, and reproducible approach.  The end result will 
be a health indicator of NSC, based on the NSC with MCDA methodology that will assist 
organizational decision makers in assessing the health performance of an organization’s 
NSC. 
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1.4 Theoretical Framework 
A brief literature review is provided to outline the basic concepts of a nuclear 
safety culture.  It was this review that provides the linkage from nuclear safety culture 
theory and selection of the Nuclear Energy Institutes model for empirical 
operationalization.  Different methodologies used for analyses of safety cultures are 
discussed.  The need for additional studies in the field of nuclear safety culture health 
assessment are identified and discussed. 
Researchers developed the concept of a nuclear safety culture in the aftermath of 
a nuclear accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine (International 
Atomic Energy Agency, 1988).  On April 26, 1986, reactor number four at the Ukrainian 
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant exploded, which resulted in the top being torn from the 
reactor and exposing the nuclear core (Medvedev, 1990).  Large geographical areas were 
badly contaminated, dozens of people died, and 336,000 people were evacuated and 
resettled (Medvedev, 1990).  Although the severity of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant 
accident may have been the catalyst for studies of a nuclear safety culture concept, the 
industry had its first significant safety culture incident in 1979 as a result of the accident 
at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant in the United States (Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operations, 2004).  As explained by Itoigawa, Wilpert and Fahlbruch, the accident 
at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania, 
resulted in a partial meltdown of the reactor core (Itoigawa, Wilpert, & Fahlbruch, 2005).  




errors, design deficiencies, and component failures.  The extensive literature on these two 
nuclear accidents, however, has dealt almost exclusively with technical, radiological, and 
environmental issues.  Researchers for the International Atomic Energy Agency studied 
the concept of a nuclear safety culture after the Chernobyl accident and developed 
common terms, definitions, and methods for assessment (International Atomic Energy 
Agency [IAEA], 1988).  Analysts at the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations studied 
nuclear power plant events and problems relating to shortfalls in a nuclear safety culture 
(Institute of Nuclear Power Operations [INPO], 2003; Institute of Nuclear Power 
Operations [INPO], 2004).  Perin (2005) argued that a nuclear power plant culture 
embodies several different cultures of control based on different methods of risk 
assessment.  For example, the commercial nuclear industry culture is organized around a 
structured logic of command and control, which requires tradeoffs with a parallel logic of 
problem identification and diagnosis.  The two different intra-cultural logics have not 
aligned in an environment of intense pressures relative to schedule, electricity output, and 
reduction of operating costs.  Dimensions of a nuclear safety culture may be defined by 
multiple attributes and measured through multiple methods (Corcoran, 2010; 
International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], 2002).  Researchers have typically 
employed questionnaires and surveys to measure the attributes of leadership; worker and 
manager attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors; and, degrees of beliefs of risk, stress, 
and decision-making, all of which have some relevance to worker performance and the 
safety culture (Corcoran, 2010; Findley, 2004; Itoigawa et al., 2005; Reiman, 2007).  
Other researchers have studied safety culture attitudes, values, and beliefs in other high-




1997).  A nuclear safety culture may also be defined by specific observable physical 
attributes (Corcoran, 2010; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 2009).  Observations 
of human actions and physical objects, such as the quality of physical goods and archival 
records, have been employed in some continuous improvement and safety culture studies 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Keating, Olivia, Repenning, Rockart, & Sterman, 1999).  
Human observations have frequently been used in nuclear power plant studies because 
the situation and resultant behaviors are not easily predictable (Corcoran, 2010; Institute 
of Nuclear Power Operations, 2006).  Nuclear safety culture researchers have focused on 
the individual worker's commitment and performance based on attitudes, work 
approaches, and communication systems (Reason & Hobbs, 2003; Reiman, 2007).  
Reason and Hobbs (2003) concluded that the most common worker errors at nuclear 
power plants were caused by failure to do something that should have been done rather 
than doing something incorrectly.  Some nuclear safety culture researchers have studied 
other dimensions of the complex and dynamic interrelationships within the organizational 
cultures at nuclear power plants.  Findley (2004) and Matthews (2006) found that 
organizational priorities were not always properly balanced between safety and 
production and often safety cultures were constrained when production factors became 
priorities over prevention factors.  Reiman (2007) studied the maintenance organizations 
at three European nuclear power plants and concluded that nuclear safety was affected if 
the demands of the organizational task were not aligned with the dynamics of the 
organization's culture.  Researchers have stated common parallel underlying extended 
shutdowns of U.S. nuclear power plants appeared to be the tension between increasing 




Nuc1ear Power Operations, 2003; Itoigawa et al., 2005).  For example, in 1996 the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission directed Northeast Utilities to shut down the three 
nuclear reactors at the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant in Connecticut.  Contributing to the 
shutdown was diminishing safety culture margins exacerbated by competitive advantage 
strategies (McAvoy & Rosenthal, 2005).  The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
directed closure of the Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant in 1997 because of cost 
cutting measures at the expense of safety considerations (Jackson, 1997).  A significant 
operating event occurred in 2002 at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant when the 
reactor pressure vessel head began to leak radioactive coolant (U.S.  Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 2002).  Analysts at the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (2002b) 
concluded a major contributor to this event was a shift in focus at all organizational levels 
from implementing high safety standards to justifying minimal safety standards.  These 
analysts stated that a reduction in standards resulted from excessive focus on meeting 
short-term production goals.  Within the high-risk industries of aviation and space 
operations, medical surgery, chemical processing, and offshore drilling, more safety 
culture studies have been conducted than in the nuclear industry.  Researchers have 
traced various efficiency and cost containment influences as sources of accidents 
(Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; McDonald, 
2006; Vaughan, 1996).  Based on the accidents studied, a parallel was evident among 
increasing production pressures and schedule conflicts and diminishing safety culture 
margins.  Corcoran (2010) stated that the concept of a nuclear safety culture could benefit 




This research was conducted to bridge a gap in knowledge and to supplement the 
body of knowledge on health evaluation with respect to nuclear safety cultures.  
 
1.5 Research Questions 
The research will seek to address the three questions presented in Figure 4.  These 
questions, and their associated assumptions, are the culmination of an intensive Literature 
Review (Chapter 2) that highlighted a number of issues and questions that require 
resolution in the field of Nuclear Safety Culture.  The problem statement is reformulated 
in this section as three questions this research effort attempts to answer.  These questions 





Figure 4. Research Questions 
Question 1 
How can quantitative data (i.e., Process Inputs) be obtained at a Nuclear Power 
Station that has causality with NSC health? 
 
Question 2 
How can the degrees of belief of NSC health by leadership at a nuclear power 
station be quantified for NSC Health? 
• How can quantitative data (i.e., Process 
Inputs) be obtained at a Nuclear Power 
Station that has causality with NSC health? 
Question 1 
• How can the degree of belief of NSC health 
by leadership at a nuclear power station be 
quantified for NSC Health? 
Question 2 
• How can MCDA be used to integrate the 
degree of belief of NSC health and the 
process inputs into a comprehensive 







How can MCDA be used to integrate the degrees of belief of NSC health and the 
process inputs into a comprehensive methodology to measure NSC Health Performance? 
 
1.6 Nature of the Study 
There are some limitations to this research related to data access or collection, 
model selections, and technology.  A degrees of belief assessment model must be 
selected that will ultimately produce results compatible with the MCDA model selected.  
Process Input data and degrees of belief data will need to be leveraged, collected, or 
simulated, and again those data must be compatible with the selected MCDA model.  A 
MCDA model must be selected from a number of potential options.  Finally, the research 
is constrained by the technology available to conduct the assessments, as well as to 
integrate the assessments during the third phase of the methodology.  
 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
There are two main contributions proposed for this research as illustrated in 
Figure 5. 
First, this research will present a MCDA model for integrating assessments of the 
binned process inputs data and degrees of belief, incorporating them all into a NSC 
Health assessment approach. 
Second, this research will produce a methodology for deploying the NSC with a 
MCDA model, to include a means for collecting degrees of belief data for a NSC and 






Figure 5. Research Contributions 
1.8 Definitions 
Many of the following definitions will be discussed in further detail in the 
Literature Review.  However, below is a list of terms and their intended meanings when 
used throughout this research.  Some of these definitions are extracted from the literature.  
Others are modified from definitions provided in official, government documents.  All of 
these definitions, as they are presented here, reflect the intents and purposes of this 
research. 
 
Belief: An idea held to be true that may or may not be reflective of reality. 
Consequence.  Effect of a successful risk scenario on an asset.  Consequence is 
commonly assessed along four factors: human, economic, mission and psychological, but 
may also include other factors such as impact on the environment; consequence can be 
Present an MCDA 
model for integrating 
assessments of the 
process inputs data 
and degree of belief, 
incorporating them 








deploying the NSC 
with a MCDA model, 
to include a means 
for collecting degrees 
of belief data for a 
NSC and then 
integrating it with the 






measured quantitatively if data exist, but can also be measured qualitatively either along a 
set of scales or along a single integrated consequence scale for which all consequence 
factors are considered as a whole. 
Credence. Mental acceptance as true or real. 
Critical Infrastructure.  Government and private systems essential to the operation of our 
nation in any or all aspects of the lives of its citizens (health, safety, economy, etc.), such 
as utilities, facilities, pipelines, etc. 
Event.  Event is defined as an outcome, condition or eventuality that occurred during 
some activity and resulted in challenges to safe plant operations (Adams, 2007).  
Degrees of belief.  The subjective interpretation of probability. Probability loosely 
defined can then be said to be a measure of the degrees of belief (Ramsey, 1978). 
Executives.  Corporate decision makers who are responsible for setting the long-term 
strategic goals for the organization; executives develop and implement corporate policies.  
High-Risk.  High-risk is defined as a hazardous activity or business venture where the 
risk to human life is an essential part of the operation and a proper balance between 
production and safety is required (Collins, 2005).  
Independent Oversight Organizations.  Groups that independently review the 
performance and direction of the organization.  
Individual Contributors.  Individuals who operate individually or as members of work 
groups to accomplish tasks; individual contributors may include leaders when leaders are 





Individuals.  All people at all levels of the organization; individuals include all leaders, 
individual contributors, and supplemental personnel. 
Leaders.  Individuals who influence, coach, or lead others within the organization and 
determine the vision, goals, or objectives of their teams; leaders include executives, 
managers, supervisors, and others who influence individuals in the organization.  
Managers.  Individuals assigned to managerial positions who control, direct, guide and 
advise; managers include senior managers, and may include some supervisors.  
Multi-criteria Decision Analysis. Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) is a discipline 
that encompasses mathematics, management, informatics, psychology, social science and 
economics. Its application is even wider as it can be used to solve any problem where a 
significant decision needs to be made.  These decisions can be either tactical or strategic, 
depending on the time perspective of the consequences.  MCDA methods provide 
stepping-stones and techniques for finding a compromise solution. They have the 
distinction of placing the decision maker at the centre of the process. They are not 
automatable methods that lead to the same solution for every decision maker, but they 
incorporate subjective information. Subjective information, also known as preference 
information, is provided by the decision maker, which leads to the compromise solution. 
Nuclear Safety Culture.  (Previous definition from INPO) Nuclear safety culture is 
defined as a nuclear organization's values and behaviors - modeled by its leaders and 
internalized by its members - that serve to make nuclear safety its overriding priority 
(Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 2004).  
Nuclear Safety Culture (INPO Definition).  Nuclear safety culture is defined as the core 




to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the 
environment (INPO, 2012a).  
Nuclear Safety Culture (NRC Definition).  The set of core values and behaviors resulting 
from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over 
competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment (NRC-2010-0282, 
Final Safety Culture Policy Statement, 2011). 
Nuclear Safety Culture Trait.  A pattern of thinking, feeling and behaving such that safety 
is emphasized over competing priorities. 
Organizational Culture.  Organizational culture is the shared basic assumptions that are 
developed in an organization as it learns and copes with problems.  The basic 
assumptions that have worked well enough to be considered valid are taught to new 
members of the organization as the correct way to perceive, think, act and feel.  Culture is 
the sum total of a group’s learning.  Culture is for the group what character and 
personality are for the individual (INPO, 2012a). 
Process Inputs.  The key data inputs to the nuclear safety culture monitoring process.  
This data is gathered from various sources (see Section 3.4) including the nuclear power 
plants' corrective action (incident) reporting systems, excluding proprietary, personal and 
security safeguards documentary materials.  For each input, there are data (e.g., 
deficiencies, violations, weaknesses, or strengths) that are reviewed in combination with 
data from other inputs to determine whether there is a nuclear safety culture issue.  
Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (SCMP).  This consists of key site personnel that meet 
periodically to review station performance and bin events and trends to the Traits for a 




assess nuclear safety culture trends and identify potential trends and/or emergent issues 
then roll those up to the Safety Culture Review Team.  This team consists of a supervisor 
or individual contributor representative from each of the departments at the power 
station.  Consequently, the members of this team ensure the various sub-culture views at 
a power station are expressed. 
Safety Culture Review Team (SCRT).  This is the management team that reviews the 
results of the SCMP and takes corrective actions to address trends in the safety culture.  
The primary function of the SCRT is to monitor and promote a healthy nuclear safety 
culture by conducting a reflective self-critique of information that reflects the health of 
the Station’s safety culture. 
Senior Managers.  Those managers who are responsible for the execution of business 
activities, including setting priorities for and monitoring the performance of the 
organization.  
Supervisors.  Individuals who provide direction of the day-to-day activities of individual 
contributors; supervisors may include superintendents, foremen, or work group leads.  
Supplemental Personnel.  Individuals who accomplish work for but are not employees of 
the organization; supplemental personnel include short- and long-term contractors and 
individuals who are not employed by the organization but occasionally perform work 
related to nuclear safety.  
System of Systems.  Possess the same definition as systems, but on a larger scale. For a 
hierarchy of systems, in which systems are components or subsystems of other systems; 
component systems each have a purpose of their own and would continue to operate even 




rather than being managed within the context of the entire system of systems.  System of 
systems often exhibit characteristics of complexity and widespread geographic 
distribution. The combination of several interdependent CI showing the characteristics of 
a single system, but lack an overarching management entity (Gheorghe, Masera, & 
Voeller, 2008; Maier, 1998; Skyttner, 2005). 
Systems.  Comprised of interrelated or interdependent objects.  Systems exhibit holistic 
properties not necessarily evident at the level of individual objects or subsystems; seek to 
achieve some final goal or state, and in order to reach this goal they transform inputs into 
outputs; tend to devolve into entropy without regulation and are typically organized in a 
hierarchical system of nested subsystems where the subsystems are specialized with 
different functions within the system. Systems either diverge, in which case it has many 
ways of achieving a single goal, or converge, where, from an initial state, it could achieve 
many different goals (Skyttner, 2005). 
The Organization.  The collective group of all individuals, the reporting structure and the 
procedures, policies, and practices that individuals use to set goals and make decisions, to 
accomplish tasks and to implement and maintain a healthy nuclear safety culture.  
Threat.  The threat of a risk scenario to an asset.  The threat of an intentional risk scenario 
is generally estimated as the likelihood of an attack (that accounts for both the intent and 
capability of the adversary) being attempted by an adversary.  For other risk scenarios, 
threat is generally estimated as the likelihood that the risk scenario will manifest; 
however, threat can also be estimated qualitatively as perceived likelihood. 




Vulnerability.  Ability of an asset to endure a risk scenario despite physical features, 
operational attributes, characteristics of design, location, security posture, operation, or 
any combination thereof that renders an asset open to exploitation or susceptible to a 
given risk scenario.  Vulnerability can be estimated qualitatively, or quantitatively, as the 
likelihood of a successful risk scenario given the risk scenario is identified, which implies 
that vulnerability is also related to resilience. 
Work Groups.  Groups of individuals who work collaboratively to accomplish tasks; 






The technological complexities inherent in nuclear power plants to prevent reactor 
core damage and potential radiological hazards, while ensuring continual operations to 
support electricity generation, have been challenged by economic pressures to improve 
the processes that deliver value by reducing production wastes and operating costs 
(ltoigawa et al., 2005). Researchers have stated a common parallel underlying extended 
shutdowns of U.S. Nuclear power plants appeared to be the tension between increasing 
economic and production pressures and diminishing safety culture margins (Institute of 
Nuclear Power Operations, 2003; Itoigawa et al., 2005).  
The concept of a nuclear safety culture is complex and somewhat difficult to 
comprehend.  In fact, the literature on safety culture has demonstrated that the concept 
includes many interrelated components and members of many organizations (Itoigawa et 
al., 2005). 
Organizational causes for nuclear power plant events and extended plant 
shutdowns have been examined in the literature (Itoigawa et al., 2005), and in recent 
years researchers have conducted studies examining precursors to these organizational 
causes. These precursors typically have included various dimensions of leadership and 
organizational behaviors.  Several event investigations at U.S. nuclear power plants have 
uncovered organizational flaws.  
Organizational culture and nuclear management researchers have not adequately 
studied the effect of degrees of belief of risk on the safety culture of a commercial 
nuclear power plant.  The literature on nuclear power plant accidents has dealt almost 




attempted to bridge a gap in knowledge and to supplement the body of knowledge on 
nuclear safety culture health measurement.  
Within the next chapter of this dissertation, a review of organizational culture, 
relevant safety culture literature and NSC health performance measurement is provided.  
Since organizational culture and nuclear management literature have not adequately 
addressed the effect of degrees of belief on a nuclear safety culture, this review included 
literature in the area of a nuclear safety culture and safety cultures in other high-risk 
industries, wherein the latter often focused on industrial safety cultures.  As such, Chapter 
2 has been divided into four subsections of prior studies to assist in comprehension of the 
material: an overview of organizational culture, a safety culture relative to a nuclear 
power plant safety culture, current trends in NSC performance measurement and a safety 







 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The foundational basis for this research comes from studies evaluating safety 
cultures by industry, government and academic organizations.  Researchers and theorists 
have studied organizational culture concepts, staff and budget change processes, and the 
effects of staff and budget change processes on organizational cultures.  Consequently, 
these topics were considered pertinent for this research.  The factors that define and 
influence any organizational culture have typically been viewed as difficult to quantify 
and are normally formed over a long process of implementation by members of the 
organization (Robbins, 2003).  
This section has been divided into four subsections of prior studies to assist in 
comprehension of the material: an overview of organizational culture, a safety culture 
relative to a nuclear power plant safety culture, current trends in NSC performance 
measurement and a safety culture relative to other high-risk industries.  The high-risk 
industries studies are not focused on nuclear safety cultures but rather industrial safety 
cultures.  However, there are similarities between an industrial safety culture and a NSC, 
which will be discussed (Wells, 2010).   
 
2.1 Organizational Culture 
There seems to be wide agreement that organizational culture refers to a system of 
shared meaning.  This system of shared meaning is, on closer examination, a set of 




seven primary characteristics that, in aggregate, capture the essence of an 
organization’s culture (Robbins, 2003, p. 525). 
 
1. Innovation and risk taking.  The degree to which employees are encouraged to 
be innovative and take risks. 
2. Attention to detail.  The degree to which employees are expected to exhibit 
precision, analysis and attention to detail. 
3. Outcome orientation.  The degree to which management focuses on results or 
outcomes rather than on the techniques and processes used to achieve those 
outcomes. 
4. People orientation.  The degree to which management decisions take into 
consideration the effect of outcomes on people within the organization. 
5. Team orientation.  The degree to which work activities are organized around 
teams rather than individuals. 
6. Aggressiveness.  The degree to which people are aggressive and competitive 
rather than easy going. 
7. Stability.  The degree to which organizational activities emphasize 
maintaining the status quo in contrast to growth. 
 
Each of these characteristics exists on a continuum from low to high.  Appraising 
the organization on these seven characteristics, then, gives a composite picture of an 




understanding that members have about the organization, how things are done in it, and 
the way members are supposed to behave (Robbins, 2003) 
Furthermore, organizational culture has been conceptualized as a set of intangible 
attributes, such as values, beliefs, assumptions, behaviors, degrees of beliefs and norms, 
synergistically working with tangible attributes, such as customs, traditions, rituals and 
shared group meanings (Shafritz & Ott, 2001).  Some theorists have defined 
organizational culture as shared meanings that group members assign to organizational 
concepts and frameworks that are held in common.  A definition of this type would 
include Schein's (2004) assertion that the culture of a group includes patterns of 
assumptions held in common that the group learned as it matured.  Hofstede (n.d.) 
defined organizational culture as the collective programming of the mind distinguishing 
the members of one group from another.  Others have defined organizational culture as 
the shared meanings, behaviors, and assumptions aligned with the differences in 
meanings, behaviors, and assumptions.  For instance, Schneider (1990) maintained that 
shared group behaviors and assumptions that prevail across the work environment would 
be countered by individual behaviors and assumptions.  Other dimensions and attributes 
for organizational culture have been conceptualized (Wells, 2010).  Cameron and Quinn 
(2006) summarized the works of some culture researchers, specifically the  studies 
conducted by Martin (1992).  Martin proposed three dimensions to an organizational 
culture - integration, differentiation and fragmentation - that supposedly co-exist in all 
organizations.  The integration dimension was similar to Schein's (2004) 
conceptualization that organizational culture was a set of shared meanings.  The 




organizational cultures were defined by the differences and conflicts between subgroups 
within the organization.  The fragmentation dimension was based on the assumption that 
organizational cultures were ambiguous and unknowable.  Cameron and Quinn (2006) 
argued that culture cannot be described as an attribute of an organization since it was the 
inherent in the organization itself.  Wagner and Hollenbeck (2005) summarized other 
perspectives and dimensions, including Hofstede's (n.d.) culture dimensions of power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity and Ernst's (2001) 
perspective of an organizational culture grid, wherein people orientation (i.e., 
participative leadership) and response to the environment were the key cultural 
dimensions.  Kotter and Rathgeber (2005) argued that congruence was a key dimension 
within organizational cultures.  Hofstede (n.d.) documented that organizational cultures 
differ mainly at the level of practices.  Examples of practices included symbols and 
rituals, process-oriented versus results-oriented perspectives, open systems versus closed 
systems and tight versus loose controls.  According to Hofstede (n.d.), since 
organizational cultures were rooted in practices, they were somewhat more manageable 
than national cultures which tended to be rooted in values.  Based on additional studies, 
the cultural dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and 
masculinity were amended to include a fifth dimension of long-term versus short-term 
orientation (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2004).  A long-term orientation indicated values of 
efficiency, stewardship, and perseverance, with an organizational mindset of 
safeguarding the organization or group.  A short-term orientation indicated values of 
sustaining tradition, protecting a group's reputation, and meeting obligations (Wells, 




organizations, application of orientation to business cultural practices was not clear.  The 
classical conceptualization of culture was viewed as a process within a non-equilibrium 
state and included diagnosis as a key component for understanding an organization's 
culture and eventually changing the culture to a desired state (Seel, 2000).  Seel argued 
that organizational culture should be considered an emergent result of conversations and 
negotiations between members of an organization.  The implications of this viewpoint 
were that organizational cultures should be described by participative and collaborative 
inquiry rather than diagnosis (Wells, 2010).  Seel applied Schein's (2004) approaches to 
organizational culture to the argument - if a culture is co-created by the collective 
membership of the organization, then these members should jointly inquire into it.  In an 
effort to identify the specific constructs used by researchers to describe the larger concept 
of organizational culture, Detert, Schroeder, and Mauriel (2000) performed a qualitative 
content analysis of the literature.  The results of the analysis indicated a small number of 
constructs were common in the majority of existing culture research.  These constructs 
included ideas held within organizations about the basis of truth and rationality, the 
nature of time and the time horizon, stability relative to change and innovation, 
orientation to work, isolation relative to cooperation, and orientation and focus (i.e., 
internal versus external focus).  The last construct was of interest from a continuous 
improvement perspective.  It included ideas about whether the organization assumes it 
controls, or is controlled by, its external environment, wherein the focus would be either 
on improving processes in the organization or on improving its standing in the industry 
(Detert et al., 2000).  Culture in groups and organizations has been difficult to define in 




broadness and inclusiveness of organizational culture have resulted in the many different 
conceptualizations.  As noted by Cameron and Quinn, since the concept is comprised of a 
set of complex, interrelated, and ambiguous factors, it would be impossible to include 
every relevant factor when assessing organizational culture.  Reason (1997) observed that 
a continuing controversy among social scientists was whether a culture is something an 
organization has or whether it is something an organization is.  Reason viewed culture as 
a hidden force that unified an organization by providing meaning, direction, and 
mobilization.  Although operationally culture has been defined as shared values, beliefs, 
assumptions, and norms, these concepts are seldom documented yet learned by living in 
an organization and becoming a part of it (Frick, 2007).  Different conceptualizations of 
organizational culture may have been developed due to differences in actual 
organizational cultures.  As stated by Shafritz and Ott (2001) , each organizational culture 
is different because what has worked repeatedly for one organization may not for another, 
which results in changes to basic assumptions.  These researchers maintained that an 
organization's culture is shaped by many factors, including the societal culture in which it 
resides and its technologies, markets, and competition (Wells, 2010).  Further, some 
organizations have many subcultures that exist in different geographical areas (Shafritz & 
Ott, 2001).  Other factors that shape an organization's culture include the structural 
foundations of the organization, which may be ordered by the regulatory environment, 
and the internal integration necessary for group functioning and adaptation to changing 
environments (Cameron & Quinn, 2006).  Schein (2004) maintained that when the 
intangible aspects of culture are applied to organizations engaged in producing goods and 




aspects of structure and patterning (Schein, 2004).  Yukl (2002) stated that structure 
would be used to stabilize an organization and the organizational structure included 
systems, processes, policies, rules, and the way the organization functions.  According to 
Schein (2004), patterning and integration would be used to bind the various intangible 
elements of culture into a coherent whole.  Schein viewed patterns as derived from 
accumulated learning as an organization solves its problems, while integration was 
viewed as derived from various subcultures, such as professional and national 
subcultures.  Other dimensions have been proposed to classify organizational cultures by 
types.  Schein presented these other dimensions as universal typologies (Schein, 2004).  
According to Schein, the value of typologies was to provide useful categories for sorting 
out the complexities of organizational realities.  The basic typology focused on 
assumptions about individual participation and involvement in the organization.  The next 
level of typology focused on assumptions of corporate character and culture.  A more 
difficult typology was described as intraorganizational.  Schein (2004) viewed the 
intraorganizational typology as difficult because work arrangements within many 
organizations were based on a combination of the work to be done and the occupational 
reference groups performing the work.  Thus, organizational culture includes formal 
structural relationships and problem solving approaches and informal assumptions and 
group interconnections (Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2005).  Based on the various 
conceptualizations of organizational culture, a formal definition of organizational culture 
was developed by Schein (2004) that included the various factors that shape a culture.  
This definition of organizational culture has been used in the nuclear power industry to 




defined as a pattern of shared assumptions that the organization learned as it solved the 
problems encountered with internal integration of its members and external adaptation to 
its surroundings.  Schein added to this definition that the organization's culture has 
worked sufficiently well to be considered valid to be taught to new organizational 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel relative to the problems of 
integration and adaptation.  Schein distinguished between underlying beliefs and 
espoused values, wherein the values mayor may not be consistent with the beliefs 
(Schein, 2004).  For example, an organization might espouse that quality is the primary 
objective for its products, but the underlying belief might be that any defects in the 
products would be marketed anyway at a discounted price.  The underlying beliefs of the 
organization's culture would be the learned responses to problems encountered in the 
external environment and problems encountered with internal integration (Wells, 2010).  
Another way of conceptualizing organizational culture is as a composite of interacting 
subcultures that have specific characteristics and a sense of identification (Wagner & 
Hollenbeck, 2005).  As noted by Wagner and Hollenbeck, subcultures may be classified 
in several ways, including occupational and professional skills and generational and 
national diversities.  Individuals in the same subcultures would tend to think and act more 
similarly than would people from other subcultures.  These organizational subcultures 
resulted in diverse networks of meaning yet were homogenous with the organization's 
overall culture.  Cameron and Quinn (2006) identified four major organizational culture 
types. 
The first major culture type described was the hierarchy culture, characterized by 




effective leadership to organize and coordinate.  The long-term concerns of hierarchy 
organizations were viewed as stability, predictability, and efficiency, thus requiring 
formal rules and policies.  The second major culture type - the market culture - evolved 
as organizations encountered new competitive challenges.  The market culture was 
described as a results-oriented organization, orientated to the external environment 
instead of internal matters (Wells, 2010).  According to Cameron and Quinn, the market 
organizational culture does not rely on rules and procedures, and has a set of core values 
focused on competitiveness and productivity.  The third major culture type was described 
as a clan culture, characterized by an emphasis on loyalty and tradition, teamwork, 
participation, and consensus.  The last major culture type was described as an adhocracy 
culture, characterized by a dynamic, entrepreneurial, and creative workplace.  This type 
organization was viewed as committed to experimentation, innovation, and change.  
Organizations develop a major culture type dependent on the industry, stage of 
organizational life cycle, and leadership style (Cameron & Quinn, 2006).  Schneider 
considered organizational cultures strong when all levels of the organization shared the 
same goals and values (Schneider, 1990).  In strong organizational cultures, people 
throughout the organization at all levels understood what they were supposed to do 
because a few guiding principles were clearly established (Reason, 1997).  Not all 
organizational cultures, however, would be desirable.  Organizational researchers have 
described a number of negative or dysfunctional cultural dimensions (Hofstede, n.d.; 
Reason, 1997; Wagner & Hollenbeck, 2005).  Dysfunctional dimensions of culture 
included paranoid, bureaucratic, and political factors.  Another type of dysfunctional 




behaviors and practices have been observed wherein organizational cultures were 
disrupted, Mann (2005) observed that counter cultures typically disrupted other 
organizational factors as well and the topic was broader in scope than simply culture.  
Researchers of organizational cultures have discussed actions necessary for maintaining 
the culture and reshaping or changing the culture (Wells, 2010).  Some researchers 
concluded that organizational cultures were maintained through constancy of business 
purpose for improvement, unity of organizational members through participation and 
ownership of work, intimacy among organizational members through sharing, and 
integrity in work practices (Smith, 2006).  Some researchers have considered cultures in 
any group setting as dynamic - naturally evolving through various kinds of incremental 
changes (Trice & Beyer, 1993).  Trice and Beyer stated that attempts to maintain an 
organization's culture involved adjustments in ideas, practices, and structures that could 
be considered changes, yet concluded that true organizational change referred to 
something more deliberate, drastic, and profound than incremental adjustments in the 
culture.  Trice and Beyer maintained that cultural changes involve a break with the past 
and continuity in organizational cultures is disrupted.  Three different types of culture 
change efforts in organizations were described - revolutionary efforts to change the 
cultures of complete organizations, efforts confined to change subunits within 
organizations, and efforts that are gradual and incremental with the intent to eventually 
change an entire organization's culture (Trice & Beyer, 1993).  Other researchers have 
considered organizational culture changes as predictable patterns (Cameron & Quinn, 
2006).  Cameron and Quinn maintained that organizational cultures change as the 




stages of the organization's life cycle organizations have adhocracy cultures.  As the 
organization matures and develops, the culture evolves into a clan culture, followed by a 
hierarchy culture and finally a market culture.  Although this theory of predictability may 
be somewhat narrow for high-risk industries such as nuclear power energy, Cameron and 
Quinn qualified the theory that culture changes in mature organizations (typically those 
classified as hierarchy cultures) have occurred in less predictable patterns.  This theory 
indicated that culture changes involving hierarchy cultures should be managed 
consciously.  According to Seel (2000), the purpose of describing an organization's 
culture should be because of some need to change the culture or to determine if the 
culture needs to be changed.  The implications of this viewpoint were that cultural 
description did not precede cultural change since organizational members participated in 
describing the culture (Wells, 2010).  Seel argued that the process of discovery and 
inquiry fostered organic change that evolved rather than the classical mandate approach.  
Yukl (2002) stated that an organization's culture could be influenced by what leaders 
communicate as priorities, values, and concerns and by the ways leaders react to critical 
incidents and crises.  Organizational leaders also have a role in maintaining and shaping 
culture by communicating the desired end-state of results (Yukl, 2002).  Schein 
maintained that leaders must first understand the organization's culture before attempting 
to alter the culture (Schein, 2004).  According to Schein, organizational leaders create a 
group's culture through primary and secondary embedding mechanisms.  Primary 
mechanisms included what leaders measure, how leaders react, how resources are 
allocated, and how leaders model and coach desired behaviors.  Secondary mechanisms 




argued that the prevailing cultural values would lead organizational members to rely on 
specific sources of guidance to make sense of what is happening around them, and that 
reliance on particular sources of guidance would influence the individual and the 
organization's cultural foundations (Smith, Peterson, & Schwartz, 2002).  For instance, 
organizational actions for improving competitiveness in response to changing business 
environments and customer demands have resulted in changes to organizational cultures 
(Smith et al., 2002).  Researchers in sociology and psychology have provided other 
perspectives on organizational cultures.  Bochner (2003) discussed the psychological 
processes that occur between individuals and groups who differ in their cultural 
backgrounds.  The researcher indicated that people working in similar disciplines inhabit 
a culturally homogeneous space in that they have comparable values, beliefs, and 
technical languages (Wells, 2010).  Bochner contended that the interaction of one culture 
with another could have potentially adverse reactions.  Major change efforts have been 
shown to help some organizations adapt to changing environments and improve overall 
performance; however, DeFeo and Barnard (2005) observed that most organizational 
change initiatives have failed to produce desired results.  DeFeo and Barnard maintained 
that the fundamental flaw in most change strategies was a focus on the change and the 
results rather than developing an understanding of how the organizational culture would 
react to the change.  Similarly, Kotter (1996) concluded that few organizational change 
initiatives have successfully helped organizations improve performance.  According to 
Kotter, when improvement initiative changes have not produced the desired results, the 
interdependence of new practices with existing organizational cultures had not been 




organizational culture.  Measurement indicators for an organizational culture and changes 
within an organizational culture have been difficult to establish because the basic 
defining dimensions of an organizational culture are not directly observable (Schein, 
2004).  This measurement problem may exist because researchers have concluded that a 
given organizational culture is defined in the organization's formal structures and 
processes, symbolic systems, products or services, and actions of the group membership.  
As observed by Itoigawa, Wilpert and Fahlbruch (2005), based on these defining 
dimensions, organizational culture cannot be quickly changed at management's desires.  
These researchers concurred with Schein (2004) that organizational culture is the end-
state of a long process of implementation by all group members in which they define and 
construct their system of meanings.  Schein stated that empirical measurement of 
organizational cultures was difficult because the concept includes shared group rather 
than individual values, assumptions, and beliefs (Schein, 2004).  It can be concluded that 
organizational culture has been conceptualized in various ways because the culture of an 
organization has been defined by both mechanistic and organic dimensions and because 
every organizational culture is different.  Empirical measurement of the concept has been 
difficult for researchers because of these competing dimensions.  Researchers have 
identified that some organizational cultures have been shaped by a distinctive subculture, 
such as a professional or industrial subculture, due to the nature of the business.  
Furthermore, an organization's culture has been influenced by other factors, including 
implementation of processes with the purpose of improving the organization.  
Organizational cultures can be changed yet some changes have not been as expected 




organizations adapt to changing environments and improve overall performance, many 
organizational change initiatives have failed to produce desired results when the 
interdependence of new practices with existing organizational cultures had not been 
adequately considered (Wells, 2010). 
 
2.2 Nuclear Safety Culture 
Since the creation of nuclear technologies during World War II, nuclear industry 
leaders and regulatory bodies has struggled with the question of how safe is safe enough 
(Dahlgren, Lederman, Palomo, & Szikszai, 2001).  Safety is a common goal for 
organizations involved in designing, operating, and regulating nuclear installations, yet 
the concept of safety has not been easy to define (Dahlgren et al., 2001).  A general 
understanding has evolved over time as to what attributes a nuclear power plant should 
have in order to operate safely (Wells, 2010).  Practitioners and researchers; however, 
continue to develop and understand one key attribute - a nuclear safety culture.  The 
concept of a nuclear safety culture was developed by researchers in the aftermath of a 
nuclear accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine (International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 1988).  On April 26, 1986, reactor number four at the Ukrainian 
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant exploded, which resulted in the top being torn from the 
reactor and exposing the nuclear core (Medvedev, 1990).  Further explosions and the 
resulting fire sent a plume of highly radioactive fallout into the atmosphere and over an 
extensive geographical area.  Large geographical areas were badly contaminated, dozens 
of people died, and 336,000 people were evacuated and resettled (Medvedev, 1990).  




reminder of the risks and hazards of nuclear technology (Medvedev, 1990).  Further, this 
accident showed the importance of maintaining strong cultural attributes related to 
nuclear safety (IAEA, 1988; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations [INPO], 2004).  
According to Medvedev (1990), the accident was caused by poor group relationships 
among plant organizations, weak communications, and pressures to continue with a 
planned test despite a known flawed design.  Kapitza (1993) observed that the safety of 
any hazardous enterprise is determined by the human factor, such that human attitudes 
and behaviors have to be factored into every stage of the enterprise, from conception and 
design to construction and operation.  Kapitza maintained that the lack of a nuclear safety 
culture mindset was the root cause of the Chernobyl accident 
Although the severity of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident may have 
been the catalyst for studies of a nuclear safety culture concept, the industry had its first 
significant safety culture incident in 1979 as a result of the accident at the Three Mile 
Island Nuclear Power Plant in the United States (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 
2004).  As explained by Itoigawa, Wilpert and Fahlbruch (2005), the accident at the 
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania, resulted 
in a partial meltdown of the reactor core.  The researchers determined the accident was 
caused by a combination of personnel errors, design deficiencies, and component failures.  
The extensive literature on these two nuclear accidents, however, has dealt almost 
exclusively with technical, radiological, and environmental issues (Wells, 2010).  
Researchers for the International Atomic Energy Agency studied the concept of a nuclear 
safety culture after the Chernobyl accident and developed common terms, definitions, 




INSAG, 1991).  These researchers defined a nuclear safety culture in more holistic terms 
that included all factors and groups that influence safety at nuclear power plants.  Similar 
to Schein's (2004) definition of organizational culture, the initial nuclear industry 
definition of nuclear safety culture included the concepts of characteristics and attitudes 
of both the organizations and the individuals.  Some researchers and practitioners have 
argued that a focus on characteristics and attitudes had confined discussions over nuclear 
safety culture to the mental-cognitive area of attitudes and noted that attitudes and actions 
do not correlate well (Wert, 2003; Wilpert & Itoigawa, 2001).  Other researchers, most 
notably at the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, explored nuclear safety cultures and 
the various factors affecting the diverse dimensions of a safety culture in order to 
diagnose the current safety culture at nuclear plants and to establish a common reference 
framework and common terminology (INPO, 2004).  Later conceptualizations of nuclear 
safety culture included the behaviors and actions that support a desired nuclear safety 
culture (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations [INPO], 2009).  These researchers used 
industry experiences and data developed by others, often based on nuclear power plant 
events, to build a body of knowledge that was not previously well defined.  As stated by 
Wilpert and Itoigawa (2001), some theorists have maintained that a safety culture is the 
organizational culture of industries that are high risk in nature.  Some researchers have 
concluded the concept of nuclear safety culture has not been well defined (Wells, 2010).  
For instance, Sorensen (2002) concluded that the mechanism by which safety culture 
affects the safety of nuclear power plant operations was not well established (U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC], 2002).  Sorensen observed that statistical 




plant operations was limited.  According to Sorensen, these limitations were caused by 
investigators of nuclear power events constructing new frameworks for each event rather 
than building on what had been studied previously.  Irrespective of the continuing debate 
about nuclear safety culture, the original concept as defined by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (1988; 1999) included a set of critical factors and organizational 
members that are foundationally important (IAEA, 1988)(International Atomic Energy 
Agency [IAEA], 1999).  Critical factors included training, goals, and policies.  One 
critical factor that has influenced nuclear safety cultures, termed nuclear business 
acumen, included the ability to manage the unique interaction among technology, 
economics, human factors, and safety in a changing nuclear business environment (Wells, 
2010).  In a subsequent study, twelve organizational factors were identified as most 
important for nuclear safety: external influences, goals and strategies, management 
functions and overview, resource allocation, human resource management, training, 
coordination of work, organizational knowledge, proceduralization, organizational 
culture, organizational learning, and communications (Nuclear Energy Agency [NEA], 
1999).  Each of these factors was considered to be interrelated, wherein one could 
influence another.  Researchers at the International Atomic Energy Agency stated the 
organizational membership included several levels, specifically the level of management, 
the level of individuals, and the extra-organizational level of suppliers and government 
agencies (IAEA, 1999).  Similar to Schein's (2004) definition of organizational culture, 
membership in a nuclear safety culture was viewed as comprehensive so that a pattern of 
shared basic assumptions of external adaptation and internal integration could work 




As noted by the International Atomic Energy Agency, nuclear safety is achieved when 
every member of the group is dedicated to the common goal (INSAG, 1991).  In 
subsequent studies, researchers have identified that a safety culture can be strengthened 
over time (IAEA, 1998; International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], 2002).   
Analysts at the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations studied nuclear power plant 
events and problems relating to shortfalls in a nuclear safety culture (Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operations [INPO], 2003; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations [INPO], 2004).  
Perin (2005) argued that a nuclear power plant culture embodies several different cultures 
of control based on different methods of risk assessment.  For example, the commercial 
nuclear industry culture is organized around a structured logic of command and control 
which requires tradeoffs with a parallel logic of problem identification and diagnosis 
(Wells, 2010).  The two different intra-cultural logics have not aligned in an environment 
of intense pressures relative to schedule, electricity output, and reduction of operating 
costs.  Dimensions of a nuclear safety culture may be defined by multiple attributes and 
measured through multiple methods (Corcoran, 2010; International Atomic Energy 
Agency [IAEA], 2002).  Researchers have typically employed questionnaires and surveys 
to measure the attributes of leadership; worker and manager attitudes, beliefs, values, and 
behaviors; and, degrees of beliefs of risk, stress, and decision-making, all of which have 
some relevance to worker performance and the safety culture (Corcoran, 2010; Findley, 
2004; Itoigawa et al., 2005; Reiman, 2007).  Other researchers have studied safety culture 
attitudes, values, and beliefs in other high-risk industries (Bums, 2005; Helrnreich & 
Merritt, 1998; McDonald, 2006; Reason, 1997).  A nuclear safety culture may also be 




Power Operations, 2009).  Observations of human actions and physical objects, such as 
the quality of physical goods and archival records, have been employed in some 
continuous improvement and safety culture studies (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Keating, 
Olivia, Repenning, Rockart, & Sterman, 1999).  Human observations have frequently 
been used in nuclear power plant studies because the situation and resultant behaviors are 
not easily predictable (Corcoran, 2010; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 2006).  
Nuclear safety culture researchers have focused on the individual worker's commitment 
and performance based on attitudes, work approaches, and communication systems 
(Reason & Hobbs, 2003; Reiman, 2007).  Reason and Hobbs (2003) concluded that the 
most common worker errors at nuclear power plants were caused by failure to do 
something that should have been done rather than doing something incorrectly.  Some 
nuclear safety culture researchers have studied other dimensions of the complex and 
dynamic interrelationships within the organizational cultures at nuclear power plants.  
Findley (2004) and Matthews (2006) found that organizational priorities were not always 
properly balanced between safety and production and often safety cultures were 
constrained when production factors became priorities over prevention factors.  Reiman 
(2007) studied the maintenance organizations at three European nuclear power plants and 
concluded that nuclear safety was affected if the demands of the organizational task were 
not aligned with the dynamics of the organization's culture.  Researchers have stated 
common parallel underlying extended shutdowns of U.S. nuclear power plants appeared 
to be the tension between increasing economic and production pressures and diminishing 
safety culture margins (Institute of Nuc1ear Power Operations, 2003; Itoigawa et al., 




Northeast Utilities to shut down the three nuclear reactors at the Millstone Nuclear Power 
Plant in Connecticut.  Contributing to the shutdown was diminishing safety culture 
margins exacerbated by competitive advantage strategies (McAvoy & Rosenthal, 2005).  
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission directed closure of the Maine Yankee Nuclear 
Power Plant in 1997 because of cost cutting measures at the expense of safety 
considerations (Jackson, 1997).  A significant operating event occurred in 2002 at the 
Davis - Besse Nuclear Power Plant when the reactor pressure vessel head began to leak 
radioactive coolant (U.S.  Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2002).  Analysts at the 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations concluded a major contributor to this event was a 
shift in focus at all organizational levels from implementing high safety standards to 
justifying minimal safety standards.  These analysts stated that a reduction in standards 
resulted from excessive focus on meeting short-term production goals.  Within the high-
risk industries of aviation and space operations, medical surgery, chemical processing, 
and offshore drilling, more safety culture studies have been conducted than in the nuclear 
industry (Wells, 2010).  Researchers have traced various efficiency and cost containment 
influences as sources of accidents (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003; 
Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; McDonald, 2006; Vaughan, 1996).  Based on the accidents 
studied, a parallel was evident among increasing production pressures and schedule 
conflicts and diminishing safety culture margins.  Corcoran (2010) stated that the concept 
of a nuclear safety culture could benefit from more research and reflection.  There has 
been limited research on the dimensions of a nuclear safety culture when confronted by 
opposing economic forces.  This research was conducted to bridge a gap in knowledge 




In summary, nuclear safety culture is to an organization what personality is to an 
individual: an intangible facet that can be seen only through behaviors and espoused 
values.  It is under constant change; it represents the collective behaviors of the 
organization, which adapt over time as the organization and its members change and 
apply themselves to their daily activities.  As problems are encountered, the organization 
learns.  Successes and failures become ingrained into the organization’s nuclear safety 
culture and form the basis for the means by which the organization does business.  These 
behaviors are taught to new members of the organization as the correct way to perceive, 
think, act and feel.  Nuclear safety is a collective responsibility.  No one in the 
organization is exempt from the obligation to ensure nuclear safety first. 
Where organizational culture is the way that people in an organization do things; 
nuclear safety culture is the way that people in an organization do things with nuclear 
safety as the overarching priority.  Lastly, nuclear safety culture is dependent upon 
having the necessary framework of an organizational culture that embraces it as the top 
priority (Wells, 2010). 
 
2.3 Current Trends in Nuclear Safety Culture Performance Measurement 
Performance measurement can be defined as: the process of quantifying the 
efficiency and effectiveness of action; a metric used to quantify the efficiency and/or 
effectiveness of action or the set of metrics used to quantify both the efficiency and 
effectiveness of actions (Neely, Mills, Gregory, & Platts, 1995).  Operationally, 
performance measurement refers to the use of a multi-dimensional set of performance 




dimensional as it includes both financial and non-financial measures, it includes both 
internal and external measures of performance and it often includes both measures that 
quantify what has been achieved as well as measures that are used to help predict the 
future.  Furthermore, performance measurement cannot be done in isolation.  
Performance measurement is only relevant within a reference framework against which 
the efficiency and effectiveness of action can be judged (Neely, 1998). 
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) model for assessing and addressing nuclear 
safety culture issues places primary responsibility on line management, and in particular, 
on the site leadership team.  The purpose is to provide an objective, transparent and 
safety-focused process, which uses all of the information available (e.g., corrective action 
program, performance trends, NRC inspections, industry evaluations, nuclear safety 
culture assessments, self-assessments, audits, operating experience, employee concerns 
program, and workforce issues) to provide an early indication of potential problems, 
develop effective corrective actions and monitor the effectiveness of the actions (Nuclear 
Energy Institute [NEI], 2010).  It utilizes the following critical organizational systems 
that are critical in supporting increased levels of safety and provides guidance for 
necessary actions to ensure the health of the nuclear safety culture. 
While it is not possible to directly measure culture, and thus there must be some 
subjectivity, there are tangible aspects of plant conditions, which can be trended to 
determine if nuclear safety cultural issues contributed to the condition.  In addition, 
process weaknesses, discovered through audits, self-assessments, or inspections, also can 




of attitudes and behaviors of site personnel can be assessed through surveys, interviews 
and the behavioral observations program, etc. (NEI, 2010).  
The INPO Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture describes the essential 
attributes of a healthy nuclear safety culture (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 
[INPO], 2004).  The INPO Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture describes the 
essential traits of a healthy nuclear safety culture (INPO, 2012a; Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operations [INPO], 2012b).  Together they provide a useful framework (i.e., 
criteria) for assessing and categorizing the data, and in combination, are used to identify 
potential nuclear safety cultural issues for action.  Using a consistent model and 
terminology throughout the entire process allows clear communication of issues with 
which the entire site can understand and respond (NEI, 2010).   
 





The following are the key inputs (i.e., the process inputs), accessing both the 
tangible and intangible; to the NEI nuclear safety culture process as illustrated by Figure 
6 (NEI, 2010): 
 
 NRC Inspection Results 
These include the baseline inspections of plant and processes (especially the 
problem identification and resolution inspection which also looks at safety conscious 
work environment and any past nuclear safety culture assessments), supplemental 
inspections, and event follow-up.  If an inspection finding identifies that a nuclear safety 
culture issue may have caused the deficiency, the station in assessing its nuclear safety 
culture can use these data.  Recurring issues receive careful review to determine if other 
process inputs are signaling problems in the same area (NEI, 2010). 
 Nuclear Safety Culture Self-Assessments 
INPO SOER 02-4 Recommendation 2 states: Conduct a self-assessment to 
determine to what degree your organization has a healthy respect for nuclear safety and 
that nuclear safety is not compromised by production priorities.  The self-assessment 
emphasizes the leadership skills and approaches necessary to achieve and maintain the 
proper focus on nuclear safety.  INPO Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture and 
INPO Traits of a Health Nuclear Safety Culture are the basis for this self-assessment 
(NEI, 2010). 
 Industry Evaluations 
Evaluations conducted by outside organizations can provide valuable insights.  




the alternate year from the nuclear safety culture assessment.  Included in the INPO 
evaluation is an assessment of nuclear safety culture, resulting in a nuclear safety culture 
assessment of a site almost every year (NEI, 2010). 
  
 Operating Experience (OE) 
Information from other sites is available from INPO and NRC to improve 
performance.  Any operating experience (OPEX) items tagged as safety culture-related 
by INPO or NRC are assessed for relevance to the station (NEI, 2010). 
 QA/Self-Assessment/Benchmarking/Behavioral Observations 
Each site performs a variety of self-reviews.  These include audits required in the 
quality assurance programs, department self-assessments, and benchmarking of other 
sites in the industry (or other industries).  It also includes behavioral observations by 
managers and supervisors in the field (NEI, 2010). 
 Employee Concerns Program (ECP) 
This program provides opportunities to raise issues outside the normal chain of 
command.  ECP issues typically are not entered into the CAP, but ECP trends are 
considered by the Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (NEI, 2010). 
 Workforce Issues 
These include data sources that could reflect concerns within the workforce that 
may be precursors to nuclear safety culture or safety conscious work environment 
(SCWE) issues, such as: grievance trends, potential SCWE claims, hostile work 
environment claims, sexual harassment or peer on peer harassment, industrial safety 




programs, change management issues and workforce management issues (e.g., staffing, 
knowledge transfer, or certification issues) (NEI, 2010). 
  
 Corrective Action Program (CAP) Evaluations 
In addition to being the program that is used to identify, analyze and resolve issues, the 
CAP is used to identify and evaluate trends across the entire data set of the CAP, for 
example, by using key words.  The data from root cause and apparent cause evaluations 
also provide insights into potential nuclear safety culture issues and trends.  The CAP is 
the largest single source of potential input to the culture monitoring process.  Because the 
CAP is so comprehensive and encompassing at most sites, it is incumbent on the site to 
select the subset of CAP evaluations that will be fed into the culture monitoring process. 
(NEI, 2010). 
 Site Performance Trends 
Each site has a broad suite of indicators to assess performance.  These indicators 
go beyond the NRC performance indicators and assess intermediate outcomes, which, if 
not corrected, could lead to safety system failures, scrams or events.  Trends can be 
developed in these indicators and the cause of the trend – process or design deficiencies, 
training, resources, or nuclear safety culture issues – can be examined and corrective 
action taken.  Examples include operator workarounds, control room deficiencies, 
preventive maintenance deferred, and open positions (NEI, 2010). 
The Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (SCMP) monitors the process 
inputs, which are indicative of the health of the organization’s nuclear safety culture; to 




organization.  The SCMP: collects process inputs for a defined time period; categorizes 
process inputs; bins the inputs to safety culture attributes; sorts data by principle and 
performs collegial challenge of aggregated data; looks for long term trends; provides 
ratings and recommended actions; and reviews status and effectiveness of prior safety 
culture-related actions. 
The Safety Culture Review Team (SCRT) is comprised of the senior-most 
management personnel onsite charged with the safe operation of a nuclear plant.  To 
promote and monitor the health of the organization’s nuclear safety culture, the SCRT 
periodically (i.e., at least semi-annually) assesses the station against the INPO Principles 
for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture.  This self-critique is intended to be reflective and 
performed by the SCRT itself in a group setting.  During this review, the SCRT examines 
a variety of information that reflects the health of the organization’s work environment to 
discern trends and early indications of nuclear safety culture challenges.  The reports of 
the Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel and previous nuclear safety culture 
assessments, INPO evaluation nuclear safety culture findings, and any insights from the 
offsite nuclear safety review board (or equivalent) are reviewed by the SCRT prior to the 
meeting.  Although a variety of inputs may be considered during the self-critique, the 
most valuable insight often comes from the frank discussion of nuclear safety culture 
based on the SCRT’s observations and insights.  As the organization’s senior leaders, the 
SCRT possesses broad, diverse backgrounds in managing nuclear power plants and the 
nuclear professionals that make up the workforce.  The SCRT is often able to discern 
subtle trends and early indications of nuclear safety culture challenges from personal 




understanding among the members of the SCRT of where their efforts to further improve 
the station’s nuclear safety culture need to be applied.   
The SCRT’s Nuclear Safety Culture Review is documented using the INPO 
Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture and INPO Traits of a Healthy Nuclear 
Safety Culture to identify strengths, areas found acceptable, and areas in need of 
improvement.  Follow-up actions are tracked.  Strengths and improvement opportunities 
that are identified are communicated back to the organization to drive desired behaviors 
and actions for fostering a strong nuclear safety culture.  The following (Table 1) 






Table 1. Recommended Actions 
Improvement Opportunity/Weakness Recommended Action 
NSCA weaknesses or negative observations Enter into CAP 
Trends noted in NSCMP and SCRT that do not constitute a 




A significant immediate indication of declining safety culture 
performance in a department (e.g., issue with supervisors in the 
department)    
ACE or CCE  
A significant immediate indication of declining safety culture 
performance at the station (e.g., issue with a department manager 
or senior manager)   
ACE, CCE, RCE, 
or NSCA  
An indication of a decline in safety culture over the last two 
quarters in a functional area (e.g., multiple workforce issues, 
emotional issues documented in CAP, etc.) 
ACE, CCE or RCE  
An indication of a declining trend over the last four quarters at 
the station (e.g., increase in allegations over historic averages, 
multiple Office of Investigation concerns in an area) 
RCE or NSCA  
A noticeable difference in a functional area from the remainder of 
the station culture (e.g., increase in CAP entries that are 
emotional, survey results indicate a measureable difference from 
the station norm, etc.)   
ACE or RCE  
 Indications of a return of a previously addressed issue indicating 
corrective actions were not durable (e.g., return of similar issues 
to issues addressed two or more years ago and believed 
corrected)    
ACE or RCE  
A continuing decline in the culture of a functional area or the 
station indicating corrective actions are ineffective (e.g., 
repetitive issues after corrective actions have been completed)  
RCE or NSCA  
Request from NRC senior management due to their concern over 
performance (e.g., longstanding plant performance in column 
three of the action matrix or performance in column four) 
Independent or 
third party NSCA  
Recommendation from external safety board to conduct 
independent or third party assessment 
Independent or 
third party NSCA  
ACE = Apparent Cause Evaluation; CCE = Common Cause Evaluation; RCE = Root 
Cause Evaluation; NSCA = Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment 
 
Few studies of economic effects on a nuclear safety culture could be found in the 




nuclear power plants.  Researchers and analysts have documented regulatory business 
decisions that indicate economic considerations have contributed to changing 
conceptualizations of a NSC.  
The NRC made official the following Nuclear Safety Culture Statement of Policy 
by publishing it in the Federal Register on June 14, 2011. 
The purpose of this Statement of Policy is to set forth the Commission’s 
expectation that individuals and organizations establish and maintain a positive 
safety culture commensurate with the safety and security significance of their 
activities and the nature and complexity of their organizations and functions.  This 
includes all licensees, certificate holders, permit holders, authorization holders, 
holders of quality assurance program approvals, vendors and suppliers of safety-
related components, and applicants for a license, certificate, permit, authorization, 
or quality assurance program approval, subject to NRC authority.  The 
Commission encourages the Agreement States, Agreement State licensees and 
other organizations interested in nuclear safety to support the development and 
maintenance of a positive safety culture, as articulated in this Statement of Policy.  
Nuclear Safety Culture is defined as the core values and behaviors resulting from 
a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over 
competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment.  Individuals 
and organizations performing regulated activities bear the primary responsibility 
for safety and security.  The performance of individuals and organizations can be 
monitored and trended and, therefore, may be used to determine compliance with 




areas in an organization’s safety culture.  The NRC will not monitor or trend 
values.  These will be the organization’s responsibility as part of its safety culture 
program.  Organizations should ensure that personnel in the safety and security 
sectors have an appreciation for the importance of each, emphasizing the need for 
integration and balance to achieve both safety and security in their activities.  
Safety and security activities are closely intertwined.  While many safety and 
security activities complement each other, there may be instances in which safety 
and security interests create competing goals.  It is important that consideration of 
these activities be integrated so as not to diminish or adversely affect either; thus, 
mechanisms should be established to identify and resolve these differences.  A 
safety culture that accomplishes this would include all nuclear safety and security 
issues associated with NRC - regulated activities.  Experience has shown that 
certain personal and organizational traits are present in a positive safety culture.  
A trait, in this case, is a pattern of thinking, feeling, and behaving that emphasizes 
safety, particularly in goal conflict situations, e.g., production, schedule, and the 
cost of the effort versus safety.  It should be noted that although the term 
‘‘security’’ is not expressly included in the following traits, safety and security 
are the primary pillars of the NRC’s regulatory mission.  Consequently, 
consideration of both safety and security issues, commensurate with their 
significance, is an underlying principle of this Statement of Policy.  The following 
are traits of a positive safety culture: (1) Leadership Safety Values and Actions—
Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors; (2) 




promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and corrected 
commensurate with their significance; (3) Personal Accountability - All 
individuals take personal responsibility for safety; (4) Work Processes -The 
process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety 
is maintained; (5) Continuous Learning - Opportunities to learn about ways to 
ensure safety are sought out and implemented; (6) Environment for Raising 
Concerns - A safety conscious work environment is maintained where personnel 
feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, 
harassment, or discrimination; (7) Effective Safety Communication - 
Communications maintain a focus on safety; (8) Respectful Work Environment - 
Trust and respect permeate the organization; and (9) Questioning Attitude - 
Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions 
and activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or 
inappropriate action.  There may be traits not included in this Statement of Policy 
that are also important in a positive safety culture.  It should be noted that these 
traits were not developed to be used for inspection purposes.  It is the 
Commission’s expectation that all individuals and organizations, performing or 
overseeing regulated activities involving nuclear materials, should take the 
necessary steps to promote a positive safety culture by fostering these traits as 
they apply to their organizational environments.  The Commission recognizes the 
diversity of these organizations and acknowledges that some organizations have 
already spent significant time and resources in the development of a positive 




community addresses the Statement of Policy. (NRC-2010-0282, Final Safety 
Culture Policy Statement, 2011) 
 
While it is not possible to directly measure culture, without subjectivity, the NRC 
(Figure 7) and INPO (Figure 8) have adopted the same empiricist trait based framework 
for measuring the health of a nuclear safety culture.  That is, there are tangible aspects of 
plant conditions that can be trended to determine if nuclear safety cultural issues 
contributed to the condition.  In addition, process weaknesses, discovered through audits, 
self-assessments, or inspections, also can provide symptoms of nuclear safety cultural 
problems.  Similarly, the intangible aspects of attitudes and behaviors of site personnel 
can be assessed through surveys, interviews and the behavioral observations program, 
etc. (NEI, 2010)  
The performance of individuals and organizations can be monitored and trended 
and, therefore, may serve as an indicator of the health of an organization’s safety culture.  
However, the health of a facility’s safety culture could lie anywhere along a broad 
continuum, depending on the degree to which the attributes of safety culture are 
embraced.  Even though safety culture is somewhat of an intangible concept, it is possible 
to determine whether a station tends toward one end of the continuum or the other. 
Furthermore, if we could measure nuclear safety culture directly then likely we 
would have validated theories to state how to exactly create and sustain a healthy nuclear 
safety culture.  However, since we are "looking through a dark mirror" at the reflection of 
the nuclear safety culture we must be careful to ensure that we are looking at the 




metric to understand what they are trying to communicate to us.  Hence the evolution 
from behaviors indicative of a healthy nuclear safety culture to traits as we continue to 
master the elusive formula that will consistently yield the desired results.  If we fail to 
realize that we are inferring the health of a nuclear safety culture by looking at its outputs 













2.4 Other High-Risk Industry Safety Cultures 
As defined by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (2009), 
industrial safety cultures included shared beliefs, practices, and attitudes that existed at a 
business. An organization's safety culture was viewed as the end result of a number of 
factors, including management and employee norms, assumptions and beliefs, and 
attitudes; policies and procedures; actions and lack of actions to correct unsafe behaviors; 
employee training, involvement, and motivation; and production and efficiency factors.  
According to the U. S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (2009), peer 
coaching at all levels and employee awareness of changing conditions and situations at 
job locations were observed at organizations with strong occupational safety cultures 
(Wells, 2010). 
Researchers in the field of general occupational safety have maintained that safety 
accidents are typically caused by failure of attitudes, failure of technical training, failure 
of safety training, or combinations of any of these three causes (Bums, 2005; Roughton 
and Crutchfield, 2008; Williams, 2002).  Bums (2005) stated that the primary focus of 
industrial safety programs should be on changing employee behaviors and attitudes. 
Bums maintained that although many researchers have argued that trust was important in 
modeling safety cultures, attitudes about trust, whether implicit or explicit, were equally 
important.  Roughton and Crutchfield (2008) maintained that fundamental principles for 
preventing industrial safety accidents included establishing a positive culture where 
individuals understood job hazards and were not punished for reporting accidents and 
near misses.  According to Roughton and Crutchfield, a positive safety culture included 
rewarding safe workers, sharing information about accidents and near misses, and 
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assessing the potential hazards of a job while planning the work.  Williams (2002) stated 
that a positive safety culture should start with management behaviors.  
Hansen (2006) stated that a strong organizational safety strategy included 
meaningful measurement, employee participation, shared values, positive recognition, 
process improvement, continuous improvement, and alignment.  According to Hansen, 
since the work processes contributed to most occupational accidents the safety goals 
should be challenging yet causing incrementally improving processes.  Further, Hansen 
maintained that safety values should be on the same level as production values and 
aligned with all organizational members. 
Within the complex, high-risk industries of aviation and space operations, medical 
surgery, chemical processing, and offshore drilling, more safety culture studies have been 
conducted than in the nuclear industry.  Most contemporary researchers have studied the 
attributes of leadership; worker and manager attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors; 
and, degrees of beliefs of risk, stress, and decision-making, all of which have some 
relevance to safety cultures (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003; Helmreich & 
Merritt, 1998; McDonald, 2006; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Roughton & 
Crutchfield, 2008; Vaughan, 1996).  Various efficiency and cost containment influences 
have been traced as sources of accidents.  Based on the accidents studied, a parallel was 
evident among increasing economic and production pressures and schedule conflicts and 
diminishing safety culture margins (Wells, 2010).  
Mearns et al. (2003) stated there is little evidence to link weaknesses in safety at 
the organizational level with individual accidents; however, the researchers noted case 
studies of major disasters have linked weaknesses in safety culture with organizational 
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accidents. Reason (1997) maintained that work-related values, behaviors, and degrees of 
beliefs at industrial plants are universal, but are influenced in varying degrees by 
corporate and organizational cultures.  Helmreich and Merritt (1998) compared and 
contrasted the high - risk industries of aviation and emergency medical operations in the 
context of organizational, professional, and national cultures.  Survey results of 
physicians and nurses in anesthesia, surgery, and intensive care units were compared with 
equivalent cockpit crewmembers in commercial aviation.  The researchers observed that 
some organizational events and incidents occurred when organizational focus noticeably 
shifted from implementing high standards to meeting short-term goals.  As implied by 
Helmreich and Merritt (1998) these short-term goals were often based on resource or 
economic conditions and were evident in organizational cultures irrespective of the 
influences by national or professional cultures (Wells, 2010).  
The January 26, 1986, Space Shuttle Challenger disaster was an organizational 
accident caused by production influences.  Vaughan (1996) concluded that over time 
production pressures became institutionalized at the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). It was theorized that a work group culture had evolved wherein 
technical deviations were normalized when the work groups encountered consistent 
contributing factors of economic and scheduling pressures.  
The February 1, 2003, Space Shuttle Columbia disaster was an organizational 
accident with similar preconditions to the Challenger disaster.  NASA management had 
to devise a new business approach when the United States government reduced the 
national space budget by 40% during the period of 1992 to 2000 (Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board, 2003).  While the intent of the new approach was to improve 
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efficiency and effectiveness, the result was a decrease in resources.  Under funding 
pressure, NASA management began outsourcing much of its work to contractors and 
simultaneously began reducing the scope of its operational, or institutional, safety 
program (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003). It was assumed that NASA's 
ownership of operational safety could be reduced because the contractors would assume 
the responsibility for safety.  Investigators at the Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
concluded that organizational streamlining and downsizing conveyed an additional 
message to workers that efficiency was an important goal.  Combined with the reductions 
that decreased the safety focus, efficiency was viewed by employees as more important 
than safety (Wells, 2010). 
Reason (1997) studied safety accidents in aviation, petrochemical, offshore oil, 
and transportation industries.  Reason concluded that significant accidents in some high- 
risk industries could be repeated in other high-risk industries because of flaws in causal 
analyses that led to a misguided focus on technical failures rather than organizational 
weaknesses as learning organizations.  Thus, some safety critical organizations had not 
been effectively solving underlying safety culture problems and, in turn, were not 
effectively learning from accidents and incidents whether small or large in magnitude. 
Based on the accidents studied, a parallel was evident between increasing economic and 
production pressures and diminishing safety culture margins. 
According to Reason (1997), the components of a safety culture included an 
informed culture, a reporting culture, a just culture, a learning culture, and a flexible 
culture.  An informed culture was described as leadership-based, in that those responsible 
for managing the organizational system had current knowledge about the human, 
65 
 
technical, organizational, and environmental factors that determined the safety of the 
organization as a whole.  Reason (1997) maintained that leaders must understand and 
acknowledge that people were usually not the instigators of accidents or incidents and 
that they usually inherited bad situations that had been developing over a long period.  A 
reporting culture was described as a climate in which workers were prepared to report 
their errors and near misses.  Reason viewed a just culture as a way of thinking that 
promoted a questioning attitude, was resistant to complacency, was committed to 
excellence, and included accountability at all levels of the organization.  A learning 
culture was described as a willingness to draw the right conclusions from its safety 
information system and to implement major reforms.  Reason viewed the last component 
as a culture where the organization was able to reconfigure itself during times of 
environmental changes or attacks (Wells, 2010). 
Mearns et al. (2003) concluded from studies of offshore oil and gas operations 
that safety cultures were affected by the convergence of several hazardous factors, 
including the potential for fire, explosion, and other accidents, work stress, priorities of 
continuing operations, and the isolation of installations.  In the first year of the research, 
production and schedule pressures were not considered significant contributors to a 
negative safety culture.  In the second year of the research, the researchers found that 
continued production and schedule pressures had caused these factors to become 
significant contributors to a negative safety culture.  
McDonald (2006) summarized the results from a series of studies concerning 
aircraft workers.  This researcher observed that technicians routinely did not follow 
procedures, rationalizing their actions by stating they had developed faster, better, and 
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safer ways of performing the tasks than those described in approved procedures.  For 
many of the aircraft companies studied, professional cultures were found to be 
inconsistent with organizational cultures, leading to inconsistencies between established 
requirements and the need for flexibility to meet the changing production schedules of 
the operational environment (McDonald, 2006).  
Within the complex, high-risk industries of aviation and space operations, medical 
surgery, chemical processing, and offshore drilling, contemporary researchers have 
studied the attributes of leadership; worker and manager attitudes, beliefs, values, and 
behaviors; and, degrees of beliefs of risk, stress, and decision-making, all of which have 
some relevance to safety cultures.  Researchers have documented that a strong 
organizational safety strategy should include meaningful measurement, shared values, 
continuous improvement, and alignment.  Although researchers have traced various 
efficiency and cost containment influences as causes of accidents, none have studied the 
influence of a continuous improvement process on the respective safety culture.  Based 
on the accidents studied, a parallel was evident among increasing economic and 




From the literature, it can be concluded that an organizational culture has been 
conceptualized in various ways because both mechanistic and organic dimensions have 
defined the culture of an organization and because every organizational culture is 
different (Cameron & Quinn, 2006).  Empirical measurement of the concept has been 
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difficult for researchers because of these competing dimensions.  Researchers have 
identified that some organizational cultures have been shaped by influencing factors, 
including implementation processes with the purpose of improving the organization 
(Cameron & Quinn, 2006; Schein, 2004).  Researchers have identified differing 
perspectives and frameworks for changing staffing and budget levels to increase return on 
investment (ROI); however, there has been no common formula (Shafritz & Ott, 2001).   
A NSC has been conceptualized in the literature as either a subset of the 
organizational culture or a unique subculture that resides along with the organizational 
culture (Wilpert & Itoigawa, 2001).  The NSC term is complex and consequently 
somewhat difficult to understand.  Furthermore, the literature on safety culture has 
demonstrated that the concept includes many interrelated components and members of 
many organizations (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1999).   
It might be expected, due to the interrelationship of economic forces on the 
operation of a nuclear power plant, that the introduction of a process to improve a plant’s 
ability to create value and contain operating costs would be included in studies of 
relationships of economic issues to nuclear safety.  Despite the significance of reliable 
production priorities with a focus on cost containment, there has been relatively little 
research on the various dimensions of a nuclear safety culture when affected by opposing 
of leadership and organizational behaviors (Wells, 2010). 
The literature has examined organizational causes for nuclear power plant events 
and extended plant shutdowns.  In recent years researchers have conducted studies 
examining precursors to these organizational causes (Itoigawa, 2005).  These precursors 
have typically including various dimensions of leadership and organizational behaviors.  
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Several event investigations at U.S. nuclear power plants have uncovered organizational 
flaws (INPO, 2004). 
Since the late 1990s, four U.S. nuclear plants have experienced extended 
shutdowns because of nuclear safety issues (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 
2004).  A major contributor to some extended plant shutdowns was a shift in focus from 
implementing high safety standards to justifying minimal safety standards, resulting from 
an excessive focus on meeting short-term production goals (Wells, 2010). 
Within other complex, high-risk industries researchers have studied the attributes 
of leadership; worker and manager attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors; and, degrees 
of beliefs of risk, stress, and decision-making (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 
2003; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; McDonald, 1999). 
Provided within the next chapter of this dissertation are the methods and 
procedures used to address the research questions.  Included in the next chapter are the 
rationales for the research design and instrumentation used, methods of data analyses, and 
limitations/delimitations of the research.  A discussion of ethical assurances is also 






 3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Research Methods and Design 
Research methods supporting safety are typically governed by research paradigms 
that fall into one of two categories, described as either quantitative or qualitative methods 
by authors of research design such as Creswell (2005) and Leedy (2013).  However, the 
approach to this study does not exclusively follow either of these traditional methods.  
According to Leedy (2013), if the research does not fall exclusively into one of the two 
defined categories of research, it must be a mixed method approach that draws from each 
of the available methods such that “all aspects substantially contribute to a single, greater 
whole” (Leedy, 2013, p. 258).  
Since this research is not simply a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods; a deeper understanding of the methods applied, the canons associated with 
those methods, and justification of their use is necessary to build a foundation from 
which the research can be discussed, critiqued and defended.  To that end, the research 
methods will be described by investigating three divisions of research: the ontological 
philosophy, the epistemological approach and the mode of reasoning. 
Each division of research includes a spectrum along which the research falls, with 
each end of the respective spectrum labeled to describe its nature.  The modes of 
reasoning fall into either inductive or deductive categories, ontology is described as either 
positivist or constructivist, and the epistemological position is characterized as either 
empiricist or rationalist (Siangchokyoo & Sousa-Poza, 2012).  These divisions of 
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research may be illustrated in the form of a cube, an example of which is shown 
illustrated in Figure 9.  Note that classic quantitative methods as defined by both 
Creswell (2005) and Leedy (2013) fall into the lower, left, front portion of the cube, 
depicted in red, while qualitative methods appear in the upper, right, front portion, 
depicted in green.  In addition to providing an overview of these divisions as a framework 
for discussion and defense of the selected methods, it also allows deeper insight into the 
results of this research and perhaps more importantly, the limitations of its conclusions. 
 
 
Figure 9. Research Methods Cube with Creswell’s (2013) Traditional Methods 
 
This study employs an inductive mode of reasoning.  The process of inductive 
research involves analysis of data, and subsequent abstraction of a methodology for NSC 
Health Performance measurement through identification of patterns or other features that 












knowledge (i.e., ideas) is gained through the researcher’s ability to derive meanings out 
of the information (Siangchokyoo & Sousa-Poza, 2012).  This method when juxtaposed 
with deductive methods that begin with some form of hypothesis and use confirmatory 
methods to either accept or reject a hypothesis based on results of experimentation.  
Again, inductive reasoning goes from data to idea where deductive reasoning goes from 
idea to data (Siangchokyoo & Sousa-Poza, 2012). 
In this study, the analyzed data involves thousands of hours of operation of a 
commercial nuclear power station recorded in data sets.  From this large combined data 
set, consisting of many different operational transients and various leadership decisions 
trends emerge with regard to health performance of a NSC and these trends can be 
expressed quantitatively using MCDA methods.  Through observation of these data, a 
generalized methodology may be developed to dynamically measure the health 
performance of a similar NSC and a model can be developed to express the theory as well 
as provide a platform from which to extract these measurements. 
Another division of research methods is made with regard to its ontological 
position.  Ontology refers to the nature of reality, and there are two possible positions.  
While Leedy (2013) confines the mind-dependent nature of the constructivists to 
qualitative methods, he eloquently describes the division in his introduction to qualitative 
research.  He begins by describing the positivist position in which the researcher aims for 
objectivity, avoiding any influence of the researcher due to impressions or bias.  Thus, 
the positivist in a general sense is represented by a philosophy in which research 
describes the elements of the real world without need of interpretation – it is mind 
independent.  Results of a positivist approach would be expected to yield objective 
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conclusions, and those should not be significantly different among different researchers 
who study the topic.  The opposing view is a constructivist approach in which the 
research is formulated through mind-dependent processes, relying on subjective 
evaluation of reality by participants or the judgment of experts in the field.  To quote 
Leedy (2013), “the [constructivist] researcher is an instrument in much the same way an 
oscilloscope, sociogram, or rating scale is an instrument” (p. 139).  The research 
proposed for this dissertation is heavily weighted toward a constructivist position in that 
the process developed through this research is largely based on the interpretation of the 
data described above.  Finally, since the concept of acceptable NSC health is inherently 
dependent upon human judgment, implying there must be some level of mind-dependent 
influence, this paper relies primarily on well-established quantitative expressions for 
acceptable NSC healthy defined by both the NRC and INPO.  Once defined, the 
separation functions developed herein treat NSC health as a dependent variable without 
further interpretation.  Indeed, the value of NSC health modeling lies largely within the 
expected standardization of the process and uniform application by clients, necessitating 
a positivist methodology that may be replicated not only by other researchers, but also by 
practitioners in similar fields. 
Finally, research is also influenced by its epistemological approach, a concept that 
refers to the method by which human beings develop understanding of reality.  Once 
again, the possibilities are divided to describe two ends of a spectrum with one end being 
referred to as empiricist and the other rationalist in nature.  Empiricism suggests that 
research is accomplished through observation, while rationalism seeks knowledge 
through reasoning.  While a substantial data set has been accumulated and studied in 
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preparation for this research the approach to developing a working NSC health model is 
largely empiricist in its nature.  The observation of nuclear power plants, all of which are 
equipped with Corrective Action Systems (CAS), allows insight into their respective 
NSC. 
In summary, the research process described in the next section will be 
accomplished through application of an overall qualitative approach that has been 
described as a synthetic method and is positioned in the research cube as illustrated in 
Figure 10 (Siangchokyoo & Sousa-Poza, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 10. Research Method for Development of Separation Functions 
 
This method is executed by applying an inductive mode of reasoning (i.e., usage 
of synthesis reasoning to obtain ideas or knowledge) in combination with empiricist (i.e., 








through the mind of the observer) research philosophies (Figure 11) (Siangchokyoo & 
Sousa-Poza, 2012).  The result is the development of a methodology, expressed as a 
MCDA model that allows management to evaluate NSC health and to make decisions 
with regard to system capacity necessary to meet demand while maintaining the highest 
level of NSC health (Bell, 2014). 
 
Figure 11. Qualitative Methodology Research Paradigm 
 
3.2 Participants 
A survey was administered to members of the Nuclear Safety Culture (NSC) 
Monitoring Team and Panel at Surry Power Station (SPS) in order to obtain degrees of 
belief information with respect to NSC Health Performance.  Surry Power Station nuclear 
power plant was selected because the plant leadership had a desire to improve their 
methodology for NSC health performance assessment.  Access to the populations and the 
plants' corrective action systems were obtained through the plant's leadership team.  The 
Epistemological Position 
Empiricist: 
• Justification of knowledge 
through observations and the 




•Reality is constructed through 
the mind of the observer 
•Relies on the credibility of the 
results 
•Results considered true should 
others also accept the claim to 
be credible in exemplifying 
reality 
Mode of Reasoning 
Inductive:  
•Usage of synthesis reasoning 
to obtain ideas or knowledge 




researcher had made previous inquiries with the subject nuclear power plant and 
experienced no difficulties in gaining access to study the plant's systems. 
Human subjects were not directly involved in data collection or analysis.  Source 
documentation within the corrective action systems at the plant was analyzed during this 
study.  Although workforce populations were included in the study, they were not 
considered participants.  These workforce members were not specifically selected for this 
study and did not participate in any part of this study. 
 
3.3 Materials and Instruments 
Data (i.e., Process Inputs) for the safety culture indicators were gathered from 
various sources (see Section 3.4) including the nuclear power plant’s corrective action 
(incident) reporting systems (CAS), excluding proprietary, personal, and security 
safeguards documentary materials.  Approval to use these reporting systems was 
appropriately obtained (Appendix B).  Nuclear power plant CAS are computerized to 
support collecting, sorting and analyzing performance trends.  Instrumentation included a 
standardized collection of trending criteria and codes, classified by key input types and 
tabulated in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  A standardized coding structure with unique 
designators (i.e., codes) is utilized by SPS to ensure consistency in the coding process.  
Use of common trending codes resulted in identification of changes in frequency of 
occurrence of a given parameter or a change in operational performance levels across a 





3.4 Operational Definition of Process Inputs 
The following are the key process inputs, accessing both the tangible and 
intangible, to a typical nuclear safety culture process (NEI, 2010): 
 NRC inspection results 
These include the baseline inspections of plant and processes (especially the 
problem identification and resolution inspection which also looks at safety conscious 
work environment and any past nuclear safety culture assessments), supplemental 
inspections, and event follow-up.  If an inspection finding identifies that a nuclear safety 
culture issue may have caused the deficiency, the station in assessing its nuclear safety 
culture can use this data.  Recurring issues receive careful review to determine if other 
process inputs are signaling problems in the same area (NEI, 2010). 
 Nuclear Safety Culture Self-Assessments 
INPO SOER 02-4 recommendation 2 states: Conduct a self-assessment to 
determine to what degree your organization has a healthy respect for nuclear safety and 
that nuclear safety is not compromised by production priorities.  The self-assessment 
emphasizes the leadership skills and approaches necessary to achieve and maintain the 
proper focus on nuclear safety.  INPO Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture and 
INPO Traits of a Health Nuclear Safety Culture are the basis for this self-assessment 
(NEI, 2010). 
 Industry Evaluations 
Evaluations conducted by outside organizations can provide valuable insights.  
For example, INPO evaluations are conducted approximately every other year, ideally in 
the alternate year from the nuclear safety culture assessment.  Included in the INPO 
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evaluation is an assessment of nuclear safety culture, resulting in a nuclear safety culture 
assessment of a site almost every year (NEI, 2010). 
 Operating Experience (OE) 
Information from other sites is available from INPO and NRC to improve 
performance.  Any operating experience (OPEX) items tagged as safety culture-related 
by INPO or NRC are assessed for relevance to the station (NEI, 2010). 
 QA/Self-Assessment/Benchmarking/Behavioral Observations 
Each site performs a variety of self-reviews.  These include audits required in the 
quality assurance programs, department self-assessments, and benchmarking of other 
sites in the industry (or other industries).  It also includes behavioral observations by 
managers and supervisors in the field (NEI, 2010). 
 Employee Concerns Program (ECP) 
This program provides opportunities to raise issues outside the normal chain of 
command.  ECP issues typically are not entered into the CAP, but ECP trends are 
considered by the Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (SCMP) (NEI, 2010). 
 Workforce Issues 
These include data sources that could reflect concerns within the workforce that 
may be precursors to nuclear safety culture or safety conscious work environment 
(SCWE) issues, such as: grievance trends, potential SCWE claims, hostile work 
environment claims, sexual harassment or peer on peer harassment, industrial safety 
trends, disciplinary action review board trends, changes in compensation/incentive 
programs, change management issues and workforce management issues (e.g., staffing, 
knowledge transfer, or certification issues) (NEI, 2010). 
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 Corrective Action Program (CAP) Evaluations 
In addition to being the program, that is used to identify, analyze and resolve 
issues, the CAP is used to identify and evaluate trends across the entire data set of the 
CAP, for example, by using key words.  The data from root cause and apparent cause 
evaluations also provide insights into potential nuclear safety culture issues and trends 
(NEI, 2010). 
 Site Performance Trends 
Each site has a broad suite of indicators to assess performance.  These indicators 
go beyond the NRC performance indicators and assess intermediate outcomes, which, if 
not corrected, could lead to safety system failures, scrams (i.e., reactor trips) or other 
events.  Trends can be developed in these indicators and the cause of the trend – process 
or design deficiencies, training, resources, or nuclear safety culture issues – can be 
examined and corrective action taken.  Examples include operator workarounds, control 
room deficiencies, preventive maintenance deferred, and open positions (NEI, 2010). 
The Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (SCMP) monitors the process 
inputs, which are indicative of the health of the organization’s nuclear safety culture; to 
identify strengths and potential concerns that merit additional attention by the 
organization.  The SCMP collects process inputs for a defined time period; categorizes 
process inputs; bins the inputs to safety culture attributes; sorts data by principle and 
performs collegial challenge of aggregated data; looks for long term trends; provides 




The Safety Culture Review Team (SCRT) is comprised of the senior-most 
management personnel onsite charged with the safe operation of a nuclear plant.  To 
promote and monitor the health of the organization’s nuclear safety culture, the SCRT 
periodically (i.e., at least semi-annually) assesses the station against the INPO Principles 
for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture.  This self-critique is intended to be reflective and 
performed by the SCRT itself in a group setting.  During this review, the SCRT examines 
a variety of information that reflects the health of the organization’s work environment to 
discern trends and early indications of nuclear safety culture challenges.  The reports of 
the Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel and previous nuclear safety culture 
assessments, INPO evaluation nuclear safety culture findings, and any insights from the 
offsite nuclear safety review board (or equivalent) are reviewed by the SCRT prior to the 
meeting.  Although a variety of inputs may be considered during the self-critique, the 
most valuable insight often comes from the frank discussion of nuclear safety culture 
based on the SCRT’s observations and insights.  As the organization’s senior leaders, the 
SCRT possesses broad, diverse backgrounds in managing nuclear power plants and the 
nuclear professionals that make up the workforce.  The SCRT is often able to discern 
subtle trends and early indications of nuclear safety culture challenges from personal 
interactions, in-field observations, and other means.  The end result is an improved 
understanding among the members of the SCRT of where their efforts to further improve 
the station’s nuclear safety culture need to be applied. 
The SCRT’s Nuclear Safety Culture Review is documented using the INPO 
Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture and INPO Traits of a Healthy Nuclear 
Safety Culture to identify strengths, areas found acceptable, and areas in need of 
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improvement.  Follow-up actions are tracked.  Strengths and improvement opportunities 
that are identified are communicated back to the organization to drive desired behaviors 
and actions for fostering a strong nuclear safety culture. 
 
3.5 Data Collection, Processing and Analysis 
Data collection, processing and analysis consist of a number of steps that relate to 
the three phases of the NSC Assessment with MCDA Process (Figure 2).  Including the 
collection of the process input data in the first phase, selection of the survey instrument to 
conduct the degrees of belief assessment in the second phase and selection of the MCDA 
model which will integrate these two in the third, and final, phase.  It also covers the 
research purpose (Figure 3), the research questions (Figure 4), as well as the research 
contributions (Figure 5).  It addresses the research limitations and it details the NSC 
Assessment with MCDA Process.  Finally, the research methodology addresses the 
sensitivity analyses along with the preliminary verification and validation of the NSC 
Assessment with MCDA Process.  A comprehensive overview of the NSC Assessment 




Figure 12. Research Methodology 
Research Purpose:  
• Evaluate NSC health as a 
function of belief and 
tangible inputs integrated by 
MCDA 
Research Question 1: 
• Can data be obtained at a 
Nuclear Power Station that 
has causality with NSC 
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NSC MCDA Process Phase I: 
• NSC Casuality Data 
Selection 
Research Limitations: 
• Data Reviewed 
• Existing NSC Monitoring 
Process Inputs 
Research Result: 
• Existing NSC Monitoring 
Process Inputs Selected 
Research Question 2: 
• Can the degree of belief of 
NSC health by leadership at 
a nuclear power station be 
quantified for NSC Health? 
NSC MCDA Process Phase II: 
• Degree of belief survey 
instrument selection 
Research Limitations: 
• Survey Instruments Reviewed 
• Instant Survey 
• Survey Monkey 
• Survey Gizmo 
• Zoomerang 
Research Result: 
• Survey Monkey Selected 
Research Question 3: 
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III: 
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 NSC MCDA Process Phase I 
The first phase of this research reviewed and selected the existing Safety Culture 
Monitoring Panel binning of Process Inputs.  This process is conducted in accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 09-07, Fostering a Strong Nuclear 
Safety Culture and the Institute for Nuclear Power Operation (INPO) document INPO 12-
012, Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture (Nuclear Energy Institute [NEI], 
2010)(INPO, 2012a).  The traits described in this document are divided into three 
categories that are similar to the three categories of safety culture found in International 
Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, Safety Culture, (International Nuclear Safety Advisory 
Group [INSAG], 1991) as illustrated in Figure 13.  The categories and their primary traits 
are as follows: 
Individual Commitment to Safety with primary traits of: personal accountability, 
questioning attitude and effective Safety Communication. 
Management Commitment to Safety with primary traits of: leadership safety 
values and actions, decision-making and respectful work environment. 
Management Systems with primary traits of: continuous learning, problem 
identification and resolution, environment for raising concerns and work processes.  
Process Input binning data was obtained for the previous three years from SPS.  
Based on the common codes for each of the ten indicators for a nuclear safety culture 
(Section 3.4), appropriate plant incident reports from plant were identified and 
subsequently evaluated to validate the coding and related trends.  The data analysis is 
expected to provide indication of both positive and adverse trends aligned with the 








 NSC MCDA Process Phase II 
The second phase of this research will develop a survey instrument to that will 
allow the belief (qualitative) of the health performance of a NSC by leadership at a 
nuclear power station to be quantified in terms of degrees of belief (quantitative).  The 
quantitative technique requires data collection with a field study an example of one of the 
quantitative methods utilized (Haltiwanger, 2012).  Under the umbrella of a field study is 
the survey that is a means for describing, comparing, or explaining a group’s knowledge, 
attitudes, and behaviors (Fink, 2003).  Along the same lines Creswell (2005) states that 
surveys “provides a quantitative or numeric description of trends, attitudes, or opinions of 
a population by studying a sample of that population” (p. 153).  Surveys provide for high 
external validity (Bowen, 1995). 
Important steps of the survey are setting objectives, designing the survey, 
preparing a reliable and valid instrument, administering, analyzing, and reporting results 
(Fink, 2003).  The objectives for this survey are developed from the research questions.  
Survey design considers the type of survey, types of questions asked, survey sampling, 
sampling methods, sample size, and response rate.  Types of surveys are self-
administered questionnaires, interviews, structured record reviews, and structured 
observations.  Self-administered questionnaires are surveys in which the individual 
respondents complete themselves.  Of the different types of self-administered 
questionnaires the web-based survey was chosen.  Advantages of a web-based survey 
included cost, short collection time, and ease of data transfer (De Leeuw, 2008).  
Open or closed questions can be asked.  In open questions respondents provide 
answers in their own words.  In closed questions respondents choose from a 
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predetermined set of answers.  According to Fink, open questions allow respondents to 
describe the world as they see it and in closed questions respondents answer questions as 
the surveyor see it (Fink, 2003).  Open questions must be interpreted and cataloged, and 
unless the surveyor is trained in qualitative techniques complexity can arise in comparing 
and interpreting the results.  Closed questions are more difficult to construct but lend 
themselves better to statistical analysis and interpretation (Fink, 2003).  The survey for 
this research utilizes closed questions. 
Answers to closed questions can be nominal, ordinal, or numerical.  Nominal 
answers require respondents to place themselves in a category (i.e. male or female), 
ordinal answers require respondents to rate the answer (i.e. very positive to very 
negative), and numerical answers require respondent to give a number (i.e. age).  The 
survey will use ordinal answers to collect data on independent and dependent variables, a 
mixture of nominal, ordinal, and numerical answers will be used to collect data on 
moderating variables. 
Two sampling methods are probability sampling and nonprobability sampling.  In 
probability sampling all members of the target population have a know probability of 
being included in the survey.  Probability sampling uses random sampling techniques.  
While in a nonprobability sampling subjects are chosen by judgment and not all members 
of the target population have a chance of being chosen.  The main advantage to 
nonprobability sampling is convenience and cost, while the main disadvantage is the 
possibility of selection bias (Fink, 2003).  Fink indicates that often nonprobability 
sampling is appropriate for surveys.  For this survey a nonprobability convenience 
sample will be chosen. 
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There is a wide range of recommendations for sample size based on total numbers 
and participants per variable.  Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1998) recommend 15 
to 20 observations per independent variable for generalizability, a minimum ratio of 5 to 
1, and having at least 50 total observations when performing factor analysis.  Gorsuch 
(1983) repeats the recommendation for a minimum ratio of 5 to 1, while Everitt (1975) 
recommends the ratio should be at least 10 to 1.  
Response and non-response rate must be considered.  Both non-response to an 
entire survey and non-response to individual questions can introduce bias (Fink, 2003).  
Fink lists identifying larger number of respondents, using surveys that interest the 
respondents, sending reminders, and following up with non respondents as a few 
measures to increase response rates (Fink, 2003).  The population will be individuals in a 
nuclear power station culture based environment that are were involved with NSC health 
governance.  Solicitations will be made through e-mail for individuals working in the 
selected nuclear power station.  A flow chart of the proposed survey development process 





Figure 14. Survey Development 
The survey developed is shown in Appendix F. Table 2 lists the questions as they relate 
to the independent, dependent, and moderating variables. 
  
Identify Independent,  
Dependent and  
Control variables 
Generate   
Survey  
Questions 
Subject Matter Expert  















Complete Integration of NSC into Ops Intra (5, 10, 15, 20) 
Significant Integration of NSC into Ops Intra (6, 11, 16, 21) 
Average Integration of NSC into Ops Intra (7, 12, 17, 22) 
Minimal Integration of NSC into Ops Intra (8, 13, 18, 23) 
Absence of Integration of NSC into Ops Intra (9, 14, 18, 24) 
Dependent Variables 
Individual Commitment to Safety Items 
binned per Quarter 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Management Commitment to Safety Items 
binned per Quarter 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 
Management Systems Items binned per 
Quarter 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 
Individual Commitment, Management 
Commitment and Management Systems Total 
Items binned per Quarter 
20, 21, 22, 23, 24 
Moderating Variables 
NSC Monitoring Experience 1 
Employee Position 2 
Military Nuclear Power Experience 3 
Civilian Nuclear Power Experience 4 
 
With respect to survey instruments the following are of particular concern:  
Reliability - consistency between the measures of a construct. 
Content validity - how well it covers the domain of the concept. 
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Face validity - how well it appears to measure what it is intended to measure.  Validity 
will be increased by comparison with the existing NSC process. 
Unidimensionality - how well the indicators represent a single concept? 
Internal validity - the extent to which the correlation being tested is between the variables 
and not an outside factor. 
External validity - the extent to which the findings may be generalized. 
Nomological validity - the extent to which the constructs relate to each other in a manner 
consistent with theory (Ahire & Devaraj, 2001). 
Reliability is increased in this survey by asking multiple questions for the same 
factor.  Validity is increased in this survey by comparison of results with the existing SPS 
NSC monitoring process.  Reliability and validity were both increased by use of the pilot 
survey (Haltiwanger, 2012). 
This survey instrument only underwent basic statistical analysis partially due to 
the low maximum response size for one nuclear power station on the order of twelve 
individuals.  While this is a low number for statistical accuracy, it must be recalled that 
the purpose of this survey is not to prove a hypothesis based on responses as would be 
performed in deductive research.  But rather the survey is an instrument to obtain belief 
degrees from Subject Matter Experts in NSC at an operating commercial nuclear power 
station to accomplish the goal of producing a MCDA model for NSC Performance health 
ranking (i.e., inductive research).  See Section 5.2 for recommendations with respect to 





 NSC MCDA Process Phase III 
The third phase of this research will determine a methodology for integrating 
degrees of belief assessments with the process inputs in a MCDA model, which directly 
relates to the third assessment integration phase.  Four MCDA models: Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP), Analytic Network Process (ANP), Multi Attribute Utility 
Theory (MAUT) and Evidential Reasoning (ER) will be evaluated for their utility in 
integrating the binned process inputs and degrees of belief information with the best 
candidate to be selected for implementation.  This final phase (assessment integration) is 
the most crucial.  Many approaches exist that could integrate the Process Input binning 
and degrees of belief assessments.  Based on the goal of this research, the result of this 
phase of the MCDA methodology must characterize the health of the NSC. 
 
 Multi Criteria Decision Analysis Models 
The research is dependent upon the MCDA model used to integrate the degrees of 
belief and the Process Inputs assessments.  Options for an integrated NSC Health 
assessment methodology include AHP, ANP, ER, and MAUT.  However, each of these 
approaches would require complex software with the research; therefore, it is valuable to 
analyze these different alternatives in order to select the most appropriate MCDA model. 
 
 Analytic Hierarchy Process 
This hierarchy provides a means for systematically evaluating the complex 
problem of ranking NSC Health.  It also provides a method for quantifying the relative 
weights of different criteria and factors making it easier to compare incommensurable 
items (e.g., loss of life versus loss of money).  However, AHP is not without criticism.  
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When ranking alternatives in terms of their attributes, some experts would argue that as 
new alternatives are added to a problem, the ranking of the old alternatives must not 
change; in other words, rank reversal should not be permitted.  However, as we all have 
experienced, especially in the realm of commercial nuclear power, new sometimes 
alternatives do (and should) cause rank reversal.  For example, the Fukushima Daiichi 
beyond design basis tsunami was considered a black swan event, unforeseeable, and 
forever changing the landscape of NSC assessments.  Most AHP software can handle 
both approaches, either allowing for rank reversal or not, depending on the preference of 
the user.  Furthermore, AHP is sensitive to the hierarchical model proposed.  If the model 
were incomplete, or otherwise inadequate, then all results of the AHP would be 
questionable.  The AHP model would need to be vetted with stakeholders and experts, in 
the hopes of adequately reflecting the complex decision making problem of integrating 
degrees of belief of NSC healthy and the tangible process inputs assessments to rank 
NSC Health Performance. 
 
 Analytic Network Process 
While both AHP and ANP use pairwise comparisons to measure weights and rank 
alternatives, there are some fundamental differences between these two approaches 
(Figure 15).  AHP structures a decision problem as a hierarchy with a goal, decision 
criteria, and alternatives.  It also requires independence of all elements in the hierarchy, 
so the decision criteria must be independent, and the alternatives to be considered must 
also be independent, not only from each other, but also from the decision criteria.  ANP, 
on the other hand, does not require independence among elements.  Often there is 
interdependence among alternatives and decision criteria, so this is an improvement over 
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AHP.  The way ANP handles this is to structure the decision problem as a network, 
which might be useful for the purposes of our research as degrees of belief of NSC health 
and the tangible process inputs are most likely interrelated, not independent. 
 
 
Figure 15. Analytic Hierarchy Process versus Analytic Network Process 
 Multi Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) 
MAUT builds utility functions for multiple attributes, independently, then 
combines these utility functions using weighted multi attribute models (additive models 
are common, but more complicated models exist).  Next, the indifference probability 
between a sure thing and a gamble must be determined.  This requires strong assumptions 
of independence, including (mutual) preferential independence and (mutual) utility 
independence.  Attribute Y is preferentially independent of X if preferences for specific 
outcomes of Y do not depend on the level of X.  For example, say that Y is number of 
days to complete a job, maybe 5 or 10 days with the cost to perform the job, X, is either 
$100 or $200.  Assume that the cost is $100 no matter what, whether it takes 5 days or 10 
days.  If we prefer a 5-day time frame, then even if we raise the cost to $200 (again, for 
both 5 and 10 days), then we would still prefer 5 days.  In this case, Y is preferentially 
independent of X.  For mutual preferential independence, we also need X to be 
preferentially independent of Y, so we need to prefer the lower cost, no matter how many 
AHP 
•Uses pairwise comparisons to rank 
alternatives 
•Structures a decision problem as a 
hierarchy 
•Requires independence of all elements 
in the hierarchy 
ANP 
•Uses pairwise comparisons to rank 
alternatives 
•Structures a decision problem as a 
network 







days it takes to perform the job.  Utility independence is basically a stronger form of 
preferential independence.  Y is utility independent of X if preferences for uncertain 
choices involving different levels of Y are independent of the value of X.  That is, if there 
were a 50% chance that Y is 5 days, and a 50% chance that Y is 10 days, then regardless 
of whether X is fixed at $100 or $200, we would still prefer 5 days.  For mutual utility 
independence, then we just need to reverse X and Y and see if the independence still 
holds.  If these assumptions were validated, then we would set up a reference gamble to 
determine the indifference probability.  In our example, the sure thing would be that X is 
some cost between the best case (X+) and worse case (X-) scenarios ($100 ≤ X ≤ $200), 
and Y would be some duration for the job to be completed.  In this case Y+ would be the 
lesser of the two values, assuming we wish the job to be completed in a shorter period of 
time, so Y+ ≤ Y ≤ Y- (or 5 ≤ Y ≤ 10).  We are interested in the utility, U(X, Y) versus the 
utility of a gamble. The gamble would have two scenarios based on a chance outcome.  
There is a best-case scenario, (X+, Y+) or ($100, 5), which has probability p.  There is 
also a worst-case scenario, (X-, Y-) or ($200, 10), which has probability 1-p.  Then we 
find p such that we are indifferent between the sure thing and the gamble. 
However, these assumptions of independence do not always hold.  Without the 
assumptions of independence, MAUT could become extremely challenging to 
implement.  Furthermore, this model requires significantly more time in order to conduct 
these reference gambles and determine each respondent’s utility.  Due to lack of 
resources, MAUT is not a viable option for this research.  In fact, regardless of resources, 
the model does not lend itself to integrating the types of data available for degrees of 




 Evidential Reasoning 
An appealing option for a MCDA NSC integrated assessment methodology is 
Evidential Reasoning (ER), which deals with problems having both quantitative and 
qualitative criteria under uncertainty, such as ignorance or randomness (Huynh, 
Nakamori, Ho, & Murai, 2006).  It is used to support decision analyses, assessments, or 
evaluation activities.  It addresses the decision problem using a belief structure to model 
an assessment with uncertainty, a belief decision matrix to represent a problem under 
uncertainty, ER algorithms to aggregate criteria for generating distributed assessments, 
and belief and plausibility functions to generate a utility interval which measures the 
degree of ignorance. 
Both ER and AHP use a hierarchy to model a MCDA problem; however, ER 
differs from AHP in a several ways.  With AHP all of the alternatives comprise the 
lowest level of the hierarchy, but with ER the alternatives are not included in the 
hierarchy at all (Xu & Yang, 2001).  Further, ER uses a generalized decision matrix 
where each element of the matrix is an assessment of a given attribute using belief 
degrees.  The decision matrix in AHP merely describes the relative importance of one 
attribute over another; therefore, “ER can be used to assess an alternative against a set of 
standards, while AHP can only compare the relative importance between attributes” (Xu 
& Yang, 2001).  Finally, ER aggregates the belief degrees of lower level attributes to 
higher level attributes gradually, until it achieves an overall score, whereas AHP 
aggregates average scores based on pairwise comparison (Xu & Yang, 2001).  One 
implication of these differences is that ER can tackle large-scale MCDA problems 
(without limits on the number of alternatives or attributes).  In addition, as new attributes 
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are added, an ER model does not need to be re-evaluated since each attribute is scored for 
each alternative separately.  ER also does not suffer from a common AHP problem 
known as rank reversal, which can occur when new attributes are added to an AHP 
model.  Perhaps most importantly, ER can handle mixed data, including random and 
deterministic, qualitative and quantitative, as well as incomplete data for some attributes.  
Furthermore, ER can incorporate AHP procedures into certain aspects of a model, such as 
using pairwise comparisons to weight attributes against each other (Xu & Yang, 2001). 
 
 MCDA Software Selection Result 
While most conventional MCDM methods use a decision matrix for problem 
modeling, the ER approach uses a belief decision matrix, of which the conventional 
decision matrix is a special case.  In a belief decision matrix, a distribution instead of a 
single value is used to represent an alternative’s performance on an attribute.  For 
example, if a company is assessed to be Excellent on short-term planning and Poor on 
long-term planning, it would then be described as Average on Planning in a decision 
matrix, while in a belief decision matrix, this would be a distribution of {[Excellent 
50%], [Average, 0], [Poor, 50%]}.  A modified Dempster’s evidence combination 
algorithm is used for aggregating the information in the belief decision matrix.  The 
aggregation process is nonlinear, and in essence a probabilistic approach.  The outcome 
of the aggregation is also a distribution, not a single score, of an alternative’s 
performance on the top attribute.  However, a score can be calculated from the 
distribution by adding each assessment grade value weighted by the associated belief 
degree in the distribution.  However the score will normally be different from weighted 
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sum method because the distribution is generated through a nonlinear aggregation 
process (Xu, McCarthy, & Yang, 2005). 
There are two general advantages in employing the ER approach for MCDM.  
Firstly, it provides a novel belief framework to model and synthesize subjective 
information.  Secondly the ER approach can make full use of different types of data, 
including subjective judgments, probabilistic data, and incomplete data under weaker 
assumptions that may undermine other methods such as MAVT.  For example, it requires 
only the satisfaction of value independence condition, which is easy to check and satisfy, 
in order to apply the ER approach for attribute aggregation, not the stringent preferential 
independence condition required by the multiple value function theory (MAVT).  When 
there are only a few attributes, it may be manageable to check the satisfaction of the 
preferential independence conditions.  It becomes much more difficult when attribute 
number increases beyond a handful.  Therefore decision scientists normally recommend 
carefully selecting only a small number of attributes, such as 9 or up to a few tens, when 
structuring a MCDM problem.  In self-assessment, the above general advantages of the 
ER approach can be transformed into the following three practical advantages.  Firstly the 
belief decision matrix provides flexibilities in question presentation and data collection.  
Secondly, the ER aggregation process generates more insight information on 
performance diversities and supports the identification of strengths and weaknesses.  
Thirdly, the number of attribute (or questions) in the assessment model is much less a 
concern to the ER approach than to other conventional approaches (Xu et al., 2005). 
In conclusion, software for AHP is widely available but can be very expensive.  
Software for ANP and MAUT are not as common.  Consequently, ER is the prudent 
97 
 
choice for the NSC MCDA Health Performance research and conveniently, there is free 
ER software available with limited but sufficient attributes for the research.  Furthermore, 
the ER software can communicate health performance and decisions through graphical 
data visualizations, making it a logical choice for this research. 
 
3.6 Methodological Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations 
As noted by Schein (2004), the basic defining dimensions of an organizational 
culture are not directly observable, thus valid indications and measurements of these 
dimensions are difficult to establish.  Although there are a variety of quantitative and 
qualitative methods available to measure the psychological, behavioral, and situational 
aspects of safety cultures in high-risk industries, methods to measure work process 
aspects of safety cultures are limited (Cooper, 2000).  As indicated in the review of the 
literature, various aspects of safety culture have been examined through observations and 
assessments of management and control records.  Employee attitudes, values, and beliefs 
can be measured by a survey, but only through observations of worker performance or 
through reviews of event records are the application of these cultural aspects confirmed 
(Roughton & Mercurio, 2002).  
Data gathered from plant event records minimized spatial and respondent 
behavior limitations and analysis by a single researcher mitigated researcher bias 
concerns.  Gathering data from plant event records is an unobtrusive measurement 
process and does have a limitation relative to researcher control over the types of data 
collected (Trochim, 2001).  Analysis techniques of content analysis through standardized 
coding applications were in use at Surry Power Station for Binning the Process inputs 
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that mitigated most other forms of bias.  The use of the standardized codes encapsulates 
human judgment in assigning the codes to power plant event records, which can only be 
addressed through a qualitative observational study.  
History effects at Surry Power Station affected the validity of this study.  
Organizational changes, including management changes occurred during the data 
collection period.  A limitation of this study is that the research did not consider the effect 
of organizational changes.  
 
3.7 Ethical Assurances 
This research assessed the health of a nuclear safety culture at a commercial 
nuclear power plant in the United States.  Proprietary, personal, and nuclear safeguards 
information was excluded from the corrective action documents reviewed.  Personal and 
social harm was avoided.  Data obtained from nuclear power plant corrective action 
systems based on trend codes are recorded in such a manner that human subjects cannot 
be identified directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects.  This research was 
based on the concept of grouped information, for which no identifiable private 
information was obtained on human subjects.  Furthermore, data were not obtained 
through intervention or interaction with any individuals.  This research project did not, 
therefore, meet the definition of human subject research as specified in the Code of 
Federal Regulations Title 45, Part 46, and was in compliance with the standards of the 






 4. RESULTS 
 
This research investigated the ability to integrate survey instrument degrees of 
belief results and MCDA into a comprehensive methodology to measure NSC Health 
Performance.  The basis of this research was a detailed literature review showing that 
there is strong interest in maintaining a healthy NSC and that there was a wide gap in the 
body of knowledge in this area.  The literature review went further to identify a specific 
gap in the body of knowledge for accurately measuring the health performance of a NSC.  
From the literature review, a conceptual model was formed and research questions were 
built.  A survey was developed, vetted through peer review and distributed.  Solicitations 
for participation were made via the Internet and data were collected.  A quantitative data 
analysis was performed followed by a qualitative interpretation.  This degrees of belief 
data were then utilized in Evidential Reasoning Software to address the questions that are 
the focus of this research (Figure 16. Three Phases of the NSC Assessment with 





Figure 16. Three Phases of the NSC Assessment with Evidential Reasoning 
 
4.1 Phase I: Binned NSC Process Inputs Results  
Nuclear safety culture evolves over time; therefore, it is also appropriate to review 
any evidence of problems on a frequent, ongoing basis.  Personnel and organizational 
changes, budget challenges, handling of emergent issues, and day-to-day organizational 
dynamics can have a profound impact on what is viewed as important and hence can 
influence the behaviors and nuclear safety culture at the plant and across the organization.  
Many sources of data may indicate a potential nuclear safety culture issue.  Examples of 
such sources include station performance indicators, NRC inspection reports, the 
corrective action program (CAP), the employee concerns program, audits and quality 
control inspections, self-assessments, benchmarking, workforce issues, and others 
identified elsewhere in this document (NEI, 2014). 
I. Deterministic Phase 
Binned NSC Process Inputs 
from Previous Years:  
•Corrective Action Program 
•NSC Assessments 
• Industry Evaluations of NSC 
•Site Performance Trends 
•Operating Experience 
•Quality Assurance Items 
•Other Self Assessments 
II. Qualitative/Quantitative Phase 
Degrees of Belief Psychometric 
Survey 
Respondents: 12 Experts 
Software: Survey Monkey 
Data: Collected via Survey 
Data Analysis: Proportions as 
Belief Degrees Weighting 
III. MCDA (ER) Phase 
Integration of Binned Process 
Inputs and Degrees of Belief in 
Developed NSC Health ER 
IDS Software Model  
Inputs: 
•Binned NSC Process Inputs 
•Degree of Belief Weighting 
Output: 
•NSC Health Ranking 
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The CAP is the largest single source of potential input to the culture monitoring 
process.  Important causal investigations are considered for inclusion in the culture 
monitoring process.  The causes and contributors or other latent weaknesses identified are 
examined for possible safety cultural implications.  “Good catches”, CAP trends, 
anonymous reports, and other CAP feedback are considered for additional insights.  In 
addition, at Surry Power Station (SPS) the CAP process also captures issues that are not 
adverse to quality.  These lower-tier issues are examined for safety culture insights.  In 
general, special consideration is given to CAP entries that appear to be emotionally 
charged, carry negative tones, or indicate current frustration or dissatisfaction with 
procedures, processes, resources, or other organizational deficiencies.  Special 
consideration is also given to entries expressing concerns about the ability of the 
management team to address repetitive or longstanding issues or expressing lack of 
respect or trust (NEI, 2014). 
In addition to CAP data, the following data types are considered high yield inputs 
important for consideration of cultural implications.  
Regulatory Communications – This category includes items that arise from 
communications with regulatory agencies and are not already in CAP.  “Regulatory 
agencies” include the NRC, other federal regulators (e.g., NERC, EPA), and state and 
local agencies.  The regulatory communications items to capture are those appearing to 
have safety culture implications. 
Assessments – This category includes periodic and ad hoc assessments directly 
focused on nuclear safety culture behaviors, such as nuclear safety culture assessments 
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(NSCAs).  Other assessments may also be included if they address safety culture 
behaviors or appear to have other safety culture implications. 
Industry Evaluations – This includes evaluations conducted by outside 
organizations (e.g., INPO, American Nuclear Insurers (ANI), Nuclear Electric Insurance 
Limited (NEIL)).  For example, INPO evaluations are conducted approximately every 
other year, ideally in the alternate year from the nuclear safety culture assessment.  
Included in the INPO evaluation is an assessment of nuclear safety culture, resulting in a 
nuclear safety culture assessment of a site almost every year.  These industry evaluations 
are available to NRC on site and are checked for safety culture implications (NEI, 2014). 
The following lower yield data types, that may be less rich in signs of cultural 
health, are considered on a case-by-case basis. 
Operating Experience – Company-internal operating experience (OE) can provide 
site-specific insights about safety culture behaviors.  Nuclear industry OE programs and 
processes often provide insights that highlight weaknesses in safety culture behaviors. 
The insights gathered from reviews of internal OE often provide additional detail and 
perspectives which complement information available in the CAP evaluation of those 
events.  External OE is evaluated to determine if the safety culture behaviors in those 
events are being exhibited at the site.  Comparison of external OE with what the site has 
learned through its internal OE can help draw attention to the importance and relevance 
of the site’s own safety culture behaviors. 
Quality Assurance Items – This category includes items identified through quality 
assurance audits and/or assessments that have apparent safety culture implications.  SPS 
considers QA items as a potential input for the safety culture monitoring process. 
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Self-Assessments – This category includes items identified through performance-
based self-assessments that appear to have safety culture implications.  SPS considers 
self-assessment items as a potential input for the safety culture monitoring process. 
Benchmarking/Observations – This category includes items from the wide variety 
of benchmarking activities involving other sites, companies, or industries.  It also 
includes observations by managers and supervisors in the field that may provide insights 
about cultural health. 
Site Performance Trends – SPS has a broad suite of indicators to assess 
performance and are more indicative of individual/organization behaviors and values that 
support nuclear safety.  Trends are developed from these indicators and the cause of the 
trend – behaviors, process, training, resources, or leadership – is examined for corrective 
action.  Examples include operator work-arounds, control room deficiencies, deferred 
preventive maintenance, timeliness and effectiveness of corrective action, system health, 
leadership effectiveness and site staffing, fitness for duty and access authorizations. 
Miscellaneous Sources – SPS also considers optional inputs from such sources as: 
the station oversight organization; plant health reports; vendor-generated nuclear safety 
culture data such as surveys, audits, and assessments; human performance data such as 
site or department “clock resets”; and training feedback (NEI, 2014). 
The following are other additional low value inputs that come directly to the 
attention of site senior management and are important in assessing nuclear safety culture, 
but, due to the sensitive, confidential nature of the information must have all identifying 




Allegations – These include concerns reported directly to the NRC by site 
employees and contractors, and NRC requests for information needed for their 
investigation of allegations. 
Workforce Issues - These include data sources that could reflect concerns within 
the workforce that may be precursors to nuclear safety culture or safety conscious work 
environment (SCWE) issues, such as: grievance trends, potential SCWE claims, hostile 
work environment claims, sexual harassment or peer on peer harassment, industrial safety 
trends, disciplinary action review board trends, changes in compensation /incentive 
programs, change management issues and workforce management issues (e.g., staffing, 
knowledge transfer, or certification issues). 
Employee Concerns Program (ECP) - This program provides opportunities to 
raise issues outside the normal chain of command. 
These process inputs are then collegiately vetted and binned by the Nuclear Safety 
Culture Monitoring Panel members into the following ten traits divided into three 
categories.   
I. Individual Commitment to Safety, which includes the following traits: 
PA.  Personal Accountability  
All individuals take personal responsibility for safety.  Responsibility and 
authority for nuclear safety are well defined and clearly understood.  Reporting 
relationships, positional authority, and team responsibilities emphasize the overriding 





QA.  Questioning Attitude  
Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions, 
assumptions, anomalies, and activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result 
in error or inappropriate action.  All employees are watchful for assumptions, values, 
conditions, or activities that can have an undesirable effect on plant safety.  
CO.  Safety Communication  
Communications maintain a focus on safety.  Safety communication is broad and 
includes plant-level communication, job-related communication, worker-level 
communication, equipment labeling, operating experience, and documentation.  Leaders 
use formal and informal communication to convey the importance of safety.  The flow of 
information up the organization is seen as important as the flow of information down the 
organization. 
II. Management Commitment to Safety, which includes the following traits: 
LA.  Leadership Accountability 
Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors.  
Executive and senior managers are the leading advocates of nuclear safety and 
demonstrate their commitment both in word and action.  The nuclear safety message is 
communicated frequently and consistently, occasionally as a stand-alone theme.  Leaders 
throughout the nuclear organization set an example for safety.  Corporate policies 
emphasize overriding importance of nuclear safety.  
DM. Decision-Making  
Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are systematic, rigorous, and 
thorough. Operators are vested with the authority and understand the expectation, when 
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faced with unexpected or uncertain conditions, to place the plant in a safe condition. 
Senior leaders support and reinforce conservative decisions.  
WE. Respectful Work Environment  
Trust and respect permeate the organization, creating a respectful work 
environment. A high level of trust is established in the organization, fostered, in part, 
through timely and accurate communication.  Differing professional opinions are 
encouraged, discussed, and resolved in a timely manner.  Employees are informed of 
steps taken in response to their concerns.  
III. Management Systems, which includes the following traits: 
CL. Continuous Learning  
Opportunities to continuously learn are valued, sought out, and implemented. 
Operating experience is highly valued, and the capacity to learn from experience is well 
developed. Training, self-assessments, and benchmarking are used to stimulate learning 
and improve performance.  Nuclear safety is kept under constant scrutiny through a 
variety of monitoring techniques, some of which provide an independent “fresh look.”  
PI. Problem Identification and Resolution 
Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and 
promptly addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance.  Identification 
and resolution of a broad spectrum of problems, including organizational issues, are used 
to strengthen safety and improve performance.  
RC. Environment for Raising Concerns  
A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) is maintained where personnel 
feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or 
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discrimination.  The station creates, maintains, and evaluates policies and processes that 
allow personnel to freely raise concerns.  
 WP. Work Processes  
The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that 
safety is maintained.  Work management is a deliberate process in which work is 
identified, selected, planned, scheduled, executed, closed, and critiqued. The entire 
organization is involved in and fully supports the process.  
A summary of the SPS quarterly process input binning from the second quarter of 
2012 through the first quarter of 2015 is illustrated in Figure 17, Figure 18 , and Figure 
19.  Example minutes from a Surry Power Station NSCMP meeting are located in 
Appendix C.  The binned process inputs values for the last three rolling years are located 
in Appendix D (Table 5).  Approval to utilize this SPS data was appropriately obtained 
and is contained in Appendix B. 
 


















4.2 Phase II: Degrees of Belief Survey Results 
The survey was developed to obtain the degrees of belief, by leadership at a 
nuclear power station, between binned process input magnitude and NSC health 
performance.  Request for approval was submitted to and granted by the Old Dominion 
University Institutional Review Board (IRB), Appendix A (p. 172).  
The survey was then piloted to a group of subject matter experts.  Participation in 
the survey was voluntary and the participants were informed they could decline to 
participate in the survey at any point in the process without risk of any adverse 
implications or effects.  The participants of the pilot remained anonymous in the final 
documentation of results.  The pilot survey is shown in Appendix E. 
The results of the pilot were quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed.  Qualitative 
analysis was conducted by reviewing the comments section for each question and the 
comment section for the survey as a whole.  The survey instrument was modified using 
information gained from the quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
Various on-line services were investigated as potential vehicles for distribution of 
the survey.  Examples of services investigated were “Instant Survey”, “Survey Gizmo”, 
“Survey Monkey”, and “Zoomerang”.  After evaluating each for cost, ease of survey 
development, survey types, distribution methods, visual appeal, and how the results were 
packaged “Survey Monkey” (www.surveymonkey.com) was chosen.  The final survey 
(Appendix F) is, as it appears developed through “Survey Monkey”.  All survey 
responses were anonymous and none of the information could be tracked back to any 
individual or company, directly or indirectly.  To solicit participation a link to the survey 
was e-mailed by the survey author to twelve individuals that are members of the NSC 
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Monitoring Teams at Surry Power Station.  These selected individuals had a mean value 
of 31.5 years of commercial nuclear power experience and with a mean value of 4.13 
years experience on a NSC monitoring panel. 
There were a total of eight responses and the categorization of the responses is 
shown in Appendix G: Survey Results (p. 206).  While this is a low number for statistical 
accuracy, it must be recalled that the purpose of the survey was not to prove a hypothesis 
based on responses as would be performed in deductive research.  But rather the survey 
was an instrument to obtain belief degrees from Subject Matter Experts in NSC at an 
operating commercial nuclear power station to accomplish the goal of producing a 
MCDA model for NSC Performance health ranking (i.e., inductive research). 
It was known how many individuals were contacted (twelve) and how many 
responses were received (eight) for a response rate of 66.6%.  Additionally, by using a 
built-in function selection in “Survey Monkey” the respondents were not allowed to 
partially fill out a survey.  All questions for the Independent and Dependent variables had 
to be answered in order to submit the survey.  To help ensure internal validity was 
maintained it was determined that all questions on each variable be answered in order to 
complete the survey. 
Basic statistical analysis was conducted based on the discussion laid out in the 
Methodology section of this paper (Section 3).  Survey results were obtained from Survey 
Monkey and are contained in Appendix G (p. 206) and results illustrated by Figure 20, 
























4.3 Phase III:  MCDA (Evidential Reasoning) Model Results 
An Evidential Reasoning Model was developed, with Intelligent Decision System 
(IDS) software (Intelligent Decision System Version 1.2), for the determination of NSC 
Health utilizing the binned process input data obtained from SPS and the degrees of 
belief data obtained from the survey conducted at SPS. 
This model consists of twelve NSC Health Alternatives, which are the past twelve 
quarters of NSC Process Data Binning results for SPS (i.e., SPS 2012 Q2 through SPS 
2015 Q1).   
In order to determine the value of the Level 1 NSC Performance Attribute for 
each Quarter of a year Alternative there are three Level 2 Attributes (Individual 
Commitment to Safety, Management Commitment to Safety and Management Systems) 
that receive the binned process input data via ten Level 3 Attributes (PA, QA, CO, LA, 
DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP).  The model also utilizes weighting to determine the 
contribution of the Level 2 and 3 Attributes to the Level 1 Attribute, utilities to determine 
the relationship between the binned process input data and the Child Attributes and two 
sets of belief degrees.  One is used to relate the grades of Child and Father Attributes, the 
other to determine the beliefs held for the process input data selected within each Child 
Attribute for each Alternative. 
While this model is relatively simple, it is extensible and could easily address 
additional layers of complexity from an increase in the number of Alternatives under 
study, to a more complex description of the father and child Attributes (e.g., adding 
additional sub-categories or Child Attributes to each of the ten NSC Traits). 
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The utility of ER, and the IDS software for implementing ER, is its simple 
structure, which can be organized into many combinations of Attributes and Alternatives 
making it easy to implement, but capable of handling complex problems without 
overcomplicating them. 
 
Figure 25. IDS NSC Model (List-Tree View) 
 
An example of how this model appears in the IDS Software List-Tree View is 
shown in Figure 25.  In the IDS model display window, users can opt to select View > 






Figure 26. IDS NSC Model (Dialog Box View) 
 
The yellow colored boxes hold the information for Alternatives, including the 
Alternative name at the top, the ranking in the bottom left and the utility value in the 
bottom right.  The cyan colored boxes are used for inputting and displaying information 
for Attributes: the Attribute name is at the top, the weight of the Attribute in the bottom 
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left and the value of the Attribute (in case of a quantitative attribute) or average utility 
value of the attribute (in case of an qualitative one) in the bottom right.  
Each of the Level 3 Attributes (PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP) was 
defined in IDS as quantitative; however, ER can integrate both qualitative and 
quantitative data, and IDS provides that option when defining attributes.  For example, if 
the attribute is defined as quantitative, then the user can also decide whether it is a certain 
or uncertain attribute.  This is useful for defining stochastic quantitative attributes, which 
could be random variables with some underlying distribution, may be difficult to assess, 
or could suffer from missing data.  The steps to program uncertainty information in IDS 








Figure 28. Programming Uncertainty in IDS ER (Step 2) 
 
Figure 29. Programming Uncertainty in IDS ER (Step 3) 
Utilities for the Level 1 or overall attribute (NSC Performance) were assigned to 
these grades (from a linguistic set of Absent Integration of NSC into Operations, Minimal 
Integration of NSC into Operations, Average Integration of NSC into Operations, 
Significant Integration of NSC into Operations, and Complete Integration of NSC into 
Operations) as shown in Table 3.  The utilities were chosen arbitrarily, but during future 
research, how to assess and incorporate the utilities of those providing inputs for the ER 
model could be explored.  These values could easily be revised in future iterations of the 
model.  For the purposes of this dissertation, Complete Integration of NSC into 
Operations would be ideal and thus would receive a Utility of 1.  The remaining grades 
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were ranked accordingly with utilities juxtaposed to probabilities not necessarily 
summing to 1.  
 
Table 3. Grades and Utilities 
Grade Utility [0,1] 
Absent Integration of NSC into Operations 0 
Minimal Integration of NSC into Operations .25 
Average Integration of NSC into Operations .5 
Significant Integration of NSC into Operations .75 
Complete Integration of NSC into Operations 1 
 
 
To relate father and child attributes, the following belief degrees were used for each child 
(PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP).  These values could also be adjusted easily in 
future iterations of the model.  For example, future research could conduct a survey for each of 
the respective child attributes (PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP) with the results 
entered as belief degrees father grade of Absent, Minimal, Average, Significant or Complete.  
However, in the interest of keeping this model simple, belief degrees were assigned at this level 
(i.e., for the Level 3 child to Level 2 father attributes) using the identity matrix (Table 4).  The 
belief degrees that relate these father and child grades are not the same belief degrees that were 
selected by respondents during data collection via survey when they chose the grade (i.e., Absent, 
Minimal, Average, Significant or Complete) they deemed appropriate for the Level 2 child to 








Absent Minimal Average Significant Complete 
Absent 1 0 0 0 0 
Minimal 0 1 0 0 0 
Average 0 0 1 0 0 
Significant 0 0 0 1 0 
Complete 0 0 0 0 1 
 
 
Weights are then used to relate the child attributes to the father attribute. This can 
be done using visual scoring or using a pairwise comparison of attributes.  Again, future 
versions of the model could work with respondents or subject matter experts to complete 
the pairwise comparison approach provided with the IDS software, which is basically an 
AHP approach for weighting the child attributes.  However, for this study the visual 
scoring approach was utilized with normalized selected to ensure the weights added to 1, 




Figure 30. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring 
 
Using the binned process inputs for the last three rolling years (PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, 
PI, RC, WP) (Appendix D Table 5), the IDS model can now rank the twelve Alternatives 
(Quarterly NSC Performance) based on the attributes, grades, and associated utilities, belief 
degrees, and weights.  The user can select Report > Graph Ranking within IDS to obtain the 
overall ranking of alternatives on NSC Performance, the level 1 father attribute (Figure 31).  The 
user can also select Report > Visual Comparison to see further breakdowns of the first five 





Figure 31. Dynamic Prioritization of NSC Health Performance 
 
 







Figure 33. SPS 2015 Q1 on Nuclear Safety Culture Performance 
 
Figure 33 can be obtained by highlighting the alternative of interest, then 
selecting Report > Graph Belief Degree > Att at Alt, where the last selection means, 
“Attribute at Alternative”.  That is, whichever combination of attribute and alternative are 
highlighted at the time this report is run will be used to create the chart. This chart shows 
the breakdown of grades for SPS 2015 Q1 NSC Performance (with the lowest overall risk 
in the model for which degrees of belief was weighted lower than the other attributes) at 
the father attribute level (NSC Performance).  This gives an overall distribution of the 
calculated grades and belief degrees for NSC Performance (level 1 attribute), based on 
the grades and belief degrees for the level 2 child attributes (Individual Commitment to 
Safety, Management Commitment to Safety and Management Systems). The individual 
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level 2 attributes can also create similar charts to explore belief degrees using level 3 
child attributes (PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP). 
Another informative chart that is available in IDS is the radar plot.  By plotting 
the values of all of the child attributes, alongside the father attribute, it is easy to see 
which of the child attributes might be driving the overall NSC Performance score.  In 
IDS, users can select Report > Visual Comparison, then select the Tool Bar button to 
obtain a menu of options.  One of the options is an icon displaying the type of chart 
selected, and by selecting it; users see a drop-down list of chart types, including the radar 
plot.  The default view of this chart is three-dimensional, however, clicking the icon that 
looks like a set of three-dimensional glasses will recalibrate the view to two dimensions.  
Because we are exploring twelve alternatives, it may be difficult to compare them all on 
the same radar plot.  However, by highlighting alternatives and using the Select One, 
Select Group, Select All, Deselect, and Draw buttons we are able to explore alternatives 














Figure 36. Example NSC Health Performance and Traits Radar Plot 12 Qtr’s 
  
 Sensitivity Analysis 
IDS offers built-in sensitivity analyses. Figure 37 displays a trade-off analysis 
chart, found under Sensitivity > Trade-Off Analysis, which shows the overall NSC 




Figure 37. Individual Commitment to Safety and NSC Perf. Trade-Off Analysis 
 
Figure 38 displays overall NSC Performance for the twelve alternatives compared 







Figure 38. Management Commitment to Safety and NSC Perf. Trade-Off Analysis 
 
 Figure 39 displays overall NSC Performance for the twelve alternatives 





Figure 39. Management Systems and NSC Performance Trade-Off Analysis 
 
IDS can produce sensitivity analyses based on the weighting of individual 
attributes, which look at the overall father attribute ranking, or the rank change, of 
alternatives. Users can select the attribute for which they wish to perform sensitivity 
analyses (e.g., Individual Commitment to Safety), then click Sensitivity > Change 
Weight.  This brings up a dialog box where the user can select which alternatives to 
explore (e.g., SPS 2012 Q2 through Q4).  Initially presented are the weights originally 
input for the model as shown in Figure 40.  By selecting Ranking, users can manually 
adjust the weights of the child attributes to see how that affects the overall ranking of 
alternatives.  Weights do not remain normalized automatically; consequently, weights for 
the child attributes were selected that summed to 1 (Figure 41).  Adjusting the weights of 
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the child attributes, we can see how that affects the overall risk scores for the father 
attribute across each of the alternatives. 
 
 
Figure 40. Child Attributes on Ranking (Original) 
 
 
Figure 41. Child Attributes on Ranking (Manually Adjusted) 
 
Alternately, by selecting Rank Change, we can produce a more controlled 
sensitivity analysis on individual child attributes.  The graphic given in Figure 42 
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displays the overall NSC Performance scores for the first three alternatives as the weight 
of the Individual Commitment to Safety attribute is varied from 0 through 1.  It is 
interesting to note that the overall score for each alternative varies with the weight of the 
Individual Commitment to Safety attribute, but it is not a linear relationship.  All of the 
selected alternatives increase as the weight of Individual commitment to safety increases. 
 
 
Figure 42. Sensitivity Analysis of Individual Commitment to Safety 
 
The graphic given in Figure 43 displays the overall NSC Performance scores for 
the first three alternatives as the weight of the Management Commitment to safety 
attribute is varied from 0 through 1.  It is interesting to note that the overall score for the 
majority of the alternatives vary with the weight of the Management Commitment to 
Safety attribute, but it is not a linear relationship.  Furthermore, while the majority of the 
NSC Performance scores increase as the weight of Management Commitment to safety 





Figure 43. Sensitivity Analysis of Management Commitment to Safety 
 
The graphic given in Figure 44 displays the overall NSC Performance scores for 
the first three alternatives as the weight of the Management Systems attribute is varied 
from 0 through 1.  It is interesting to note that the overall score for the first three 
alternatives vary with the weight of the Management Systems attribute, but it is not a 
linear relationship.  Furthermore, while the majority of the NSC Performance scores 
increase as the weight of Management Commitment to safety increases, SPS 2012 Q4 




Figure 44. Sensitivity Analysis of Management Systems 
 
IDS can also produce sensitivity analyses of belief degrees based on adjusting the 
child attribute weights.  From the same dialog box, the user simply selects Belief Degree.  
This shows the belief degrees for the degrees of belief attribute related to the 
grades (our linguistic set) based on the weights input for the child attributes (PA, QA, 
CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP).  Notice as the child attributes are adjusted up and 
down the belief degree values of the father attributes change proportionally (Figure 45, 
Figure 46).  Future research could be conducted to better understand if the weighting of 




Figure 45. Child Attributes on Belief Degrees (Original) 
 
 
Figure 46. Child Attributes on Belief Degrees (Manually Adjusted) 
 
IDS can also produce sensitivity analyses based on the data, itself.  Users can 
select Sensitivity > Change Input Data, which brings up a dialog box that produces two 
side-by-side graphs (Figure 47).  The first graph displays the Process Input or Score for 
each grade (from the SPS data) for a selected alternative. SPS 2012 Q2 was selected, 




Figure 47. Input Data (Original) 
 
The second graph displays the Process Input Score for SPS 2012 Q2 adjusted 
down and its affect upon the NSC Performance for the respective time period.  Other 
alternatives (i.e., SPS process input data for a selected time period) or any of the other 
attributes (i.e., PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP) can also be explored as 
desired.  Although we did not drastically alter the score from the original value, we still 
see a marked change in the overall NSC Performance score 2012 Q2, which increased 





Figure 48. Input Data (Adjusted) 
 
 Verification, Validation, and Accreditation 
In addition to the data that were collected from the process input binning and 
belief degrees survey there are also data required for the MCDA model selected. For 
example, the IDS software used to implement ER requires values such as weights, 
utilities, and belief degrees in order to describe the model.  These values have nothing to 
do with the actual assessment data, but rather are used to define the way in which the 
assessment data will be integrated using the MCDA model.  While future research may 
expand on the in NSC Performance methodology to include approaches for determining 
these values, we have assigned these values as necessary in order to complete the testing 
of the NSC Performance methodology.  Sensitivity analyses were conducted to determine 
the impact of some of these selected values on the ER model.  Further, a preliminary 
verification and validation of the assessment integration model selected for the NSC 
Performance methodology was also performed and is presented in the following 
paragraphs.  However, a more thorough Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Verification, 
Validation, and Accreditation (VV&A) will be necessary in the future. 
140 
 
M&S VV&A is crucial to the development and deployment of a model or 
simulation, especially if it is to be accepted and employed by stakeholders for decision-
making with respect to NSC performance (Macal, 2005).  For example, the Department 
of Defense released instructions for VV&A of M&S (Department of Defense [DoD], 
2009) and many other agencies have developed their own standards.  
The DoD official definitions of M&S and VV&A are provided in Figure 49 
(DoD, 2009). 
 
Figure 49. DoD Verification, Validation, and Accreditation Definitions 
 
a physical, mathematical, or otherwise logical 
representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or 
process. 
Model 
a method for implementing a model over time. Simulation 
the process of determining that a model or simulation 
implementation and its associated data accurately 
accurately represent the developer’s conceptual 
description and specifications. 
Verification 
the process of determining the degree to which the 
model or simulation and its associated data are an 
accurate representation of the real world from the 
perspective of the intended uses. 
Validation 
the official certification that a model or simulation and 






 NSC Performance Model Verification 
Verification ensures that a model or simulation is programmed and implemented 
correctly.  That is, the model should be free from errors, bugs, accidental omissions, 
misapplications of the model, misapplications of the software, and invalid 
implementations of any algorithms (Macal, 2005).  Verification is the process of 
determining whether a model is consistent from concept to requirements, including a 
review of the model’s capabilities and the specifications associated with each capability.  
It is important to understand that no model can ever be completely verified, so the result 
of model verification is not a verified model, but rather a model that has passed all 
verification tests.  For the purposes of the NSC Performance Model, verifying the model 
relies upon verifying the NSC Performance assessment integration method selected for 
the third phase of this methodology, so ideally we would verify the ER model deployed 










• Does the NSC Performance model satisfy 
the intended use of ER? Question 1 
• Does the software code provided by IDS 
correctly implement ER? Question 2 
• Does the NSC Performance model, 
implemented with ER via IDS, produce the 
required results in the desired format to 




 Question 1 
Does the NSC Performance model satisfy the intended use of ER?  
In an effort to accommodate MCDA problems prone to uncertainties and 
subjectivity, ER was devised, developed, and implemented via IDS by Yang, along with 
his collaborators (Xu & Yang, 2001).  ER and IDS are now used in many areas, such as 
supply chain management, design decision support, risk and safety analysis, quality 
management, and government policy consultations (Xu et al., 2005).  ER uses a set of 
attributes, weights, utilities, and belief degrees to assess and rank a series of alternatives.  
This approach lends itself nicely to the complex problem of NSC Performance in an 
operating nuclear power station which consists of a number of attributes (PA, QA, CO, 
LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP), and also offers a series of alternatives in need of ranking 
(Quarterly Process Input binning).  ER is used to support decision analyses, assessments, 
or evaluation activities.  The NSC Performance Model would also be used to support 
decision-making, specifically for corrective or preventive measures for degrading NSC 
Performance indication.  Consequently, the challenge of ranking NSC Performance based 
on a set of attributes (PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP) is certainly an 
appropriate application of ER. 
 Question 2 
Does the software code provided by IDS correctly implement ER?  
Many MCDA problems inevitably deal with information under uncertainty, and 
that is especially true when dealing with Safety Cultures with their tangible and 
intangible inputs.  ER provides an alternative way of handling such information 
systematically and consistently.  ER is a powerful MCDA approach based on a recursive 
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algorithm that essentially aggregates information nonlinearly.  ER has been compared to 
other MCDA approaches, such as MAUT, Saaty’s left eigenvector method, Belton’s 
normalized left eigenvector procedure, and Johnson’s right eigenvector procedure (J.-B. 
Yang, 1999).  The results of those comparisons produced comparable rankings of 
alternatives.  IDS has also been compared to AHP, and while both use a hierarchical 
structure to model MCDA problems, there are some distinctions (Xu & Yang, 2001). For 
example, ER alternatives are not part of the hierarchy like they are in AHP.  AHP uses a 
decision matrix whereas ER uses a generalized decision matrix that incorporates belief 
degrees (which are not employed in AHP); also, AHP uses average scores from pairwise 
comparisons to aggregate data, but ER aggregates the belief degrees in a progressive 
manner from lower level attributes to high level attributes.  Because of these distinctions, 
IDS (the software implementation of ER) can: manage large and complex MCDA 
problems; assess new alternatives independently; produce consistent rakings of 
alternatives even after new ones are added; create a distributed assessment of alternatives 
in addition to a ranking of those alternatives; assess an alternative against standards or 
criteria (AHP can only compare the relative importance of alternatives between 
attributes); handle mixed data models (with both qualitative and quantitative data, as well 
as random and deterministic data, under uncertainty); and lastly, IDS can optionally 
utilize AHP as one of its weighting approaches for attributes (Xu & Yang, 2001).  
The detailed problem description, basic evaluation framework, algorithms, 
axioms, and theorems utilized by ER have been presented in detail (J.-B. Yang & Xu, 
2002) and demonstrate that the ER approach and IDS have sound theoretical foundations.  
ER has undergone mathematical proofs (J.-B. Yang, 1999) and the mechanics of ER 
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along with the results of ER deployed via IDS have been presented in a number of peer-
reviewed journals and conferences (Sonmez, Yang, & Holt, 2001; Wang, Yang, & Sen, 
1996; Xu, 2004; Xu & Yang, 1999, 2003, 2005; Xu, Yang, & Wang, 2005; J.-B. Yang, 
1999; J.-B. Yang & Xu, 2002, 2004; J. B. Yang, Dale, & Siow, 2001).  Furthermore, 
there is an example for which ER, using IDS, was used in the fields of corporate quality 
management to produce a European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) self 
assessment (Siow, Yang, & Dale, 2001). This example offers a degree of face validity for 
the methodology, the model, as well as the software code, all of which translates to our 
research as the NSC Performance Methodology leverages IDS to implement an integrated 
safety culture health assessment based on the binned process inputs and degrees of belief 
used to rank the NSC health alternatives, which is a valid application of ER.  
Furthermore, as evidenced by the sensitivity analyses provided earlier, as well as the 
model validations that will be provided in the next section, it has been demonstrated that 
the model behaves logically, which implies that the software code is free from 
mathematical errors. 
 Question 3 
Does the NSC Performance model, implemented with ER via IDS, produce the required 
results in the desired format to meet the research purpose? 
 
The research purpose requires that the output of the NSC Performance model 
provide a ranked assessment of NSC Health (Figure 3).  ER is an MCDA approach, 
which, like other MCDA approaches such as AHP, produces a ranked list of alternatives 
as its output.  The IDS software implementation of ER thus also produces a ranked list of 
alternatives.  The SPS Process Input Binning Data was designated as alternatives in the 
NSC Performance model.  The Traits of a Healthy NSC were designated as attributes in 
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the model, and assigned NSC Performance as the overall father attribute.  The model has 
been provided with sufficient information (including attribute weights, utilities, and belief 
degrees) to relate father and child attributes, as well as to relate our data (from the 
process input binning and degrees of belief survey) to the attributes and alternatives.  The 
output of our model is, indeed, a ranked list of NSC Performance based on an integrated 
NSC health assessment and thus adequately meets the needs of this research. 
 NSC Performance Model Validation 
Validation ensures that the model is useful (Macal, 2005).  That is, the model 
should address the correct problem and provide accurate information about the system or 
phenomenon being modeled.  Validation could also consist of a series of challenges 
designed to purposefully address any doubts about the application of the model, in which 
case, similar to verification, the results of validation do not necessarily produce a 
validated model, but rather a model that has passed all validation tests (or perhaps a 
model that has failed some tests, but may be able to pass them in the future after 
additional model improvements have been made).  Validation of complex models 
involves demonstrating that the model has the appropriate underlying relationships to 
permit an acceptable representation of the real world.  The validation plan addresses the 




Figure 51. Model Validation Questions 
 
 Question 1 
Is the NSC Performance model a valid construct to determine NSC Performance? 
 
Typically, validation requires that a newly proposed model be compared to some 
existing reference model.  However, no such model for NSC Performance was located 
during the extensive literature review.  Consequently, we will instead explore whether the 
model constructed for NSC Performance is understandable with reasonable results.  This 
validation depends on the purpose of the model and its intended use, so it is valuable to 
understand why we are using a model in the first place.  In the case of the NSC 
• Is the NSC Performance model a valid construct 
to determine NSC Performance? Question 1 
• Are the results produced by the NSC Performance 
model close to the results of the real world? Question 2 
• Under what range of inputs are the NSC 
Performance model results useful? Question 3 
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Performance model, we are modeling NSC health as a function of the traits of a healthy 
NSC, in order to make qualitative or quantitative predictions about the future.  That is, to 
quantify a NSC’s health performance based on the integrated performance assessment 
value (produced by the NSC Performance model).  In addition, the model is also used to 
gain insight into how degrees of belief affect the ranking of NSC performance.  The NSC 
Performance model uses ER that allows us to explore all ten traits or attributes of NSC 
performance (PA, QA, CO, LA, DM, WE, CL, PI, RC, WP), as well as to explore how 
those attributes interact, depending on the weights, utilities, and belief degrees supplied 
for the model.  The presently utilized NEI NSC model utilizes these same attributes.  The 
introduction of degrees of belief is now obvious after conducting this research, so the 
NSC Performance model appears to be a valid construct. 
Face validation is another technique for validating a model or simulation.  
Essentially, face validation determines whether a model or simulation appears to measure 
a certain criterion.  It is often conducted via peer reviews accompanied by surveys or 
interviews to seek the opinions of subject matter experts regarding the model or 
simulation.  ER and IDS have undergone extensive face validation by presenting the 
methodology, mathematics, and software implementation in numerous peer-reviewed 
journals and conference proceedings (Huynh et al., 2006; Wang, Yang, & Sen, 1996; 
Yang, Dale, & Slow, 2010.  Therefore, any model, which correctly implements ER and 
IDS, can claim some level of transitive face validation. 
 Question 2 
Are the results produced by the NSC Performance model close to the results of the 
real world?  
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In addition, comparing model predictions to historical data via benchmarking and 
sensitivity analysis can also validate new models.  For example, the maritime security 
assessment that leverages ER and IDS validates its model with benchmarking and 
sensitivity analysis (Yang, Wang, Bonsall, & Fang, 2009).  Sensitivity analyses of the 
NSC Performance model has been successfully conducted as stated previously in this 
chapter.  A benchmarking study was conducted by obtaining the subjective grading from 
the existing process input binning from the Safety Culture Review Team (SCRT).  These 
results were then compared to the results achieved with the new model (our NSC 
Performance model), based on the same data.  The resulting grading from the SCRT and 
the NSC Performance model were found to have fidelity with one another. 
 Question 3 
Under what range of inputs are the NSC Performance model results useful?  
A sensitivity analysis to explore different input settings of the NSC Performance 
model has already been performed.  The NSC Performance model has been compared to 
the current SCRT process with fidelity.  Consequently, a better understanding of the 
effects of weights for the degrees of belief attribute on the overall father attribute of NSC 
Performance has been gained.  The sensitivity of the belief degrees to the selected 
weights has been determined.  How changing the input data impacts the degrees of belief 
score has been explored.  Nevertheless, additional sensitivity analysis can be conducted 




Figure 52. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (Equal Weights Model) 
The output of the NSC Performance model (the ranked NSC Performance) should 
change depending on the weights selected for the child attributes.  Consequently, 
extreme-weighting cases will be explored to test the validity of the model by ensuring 
that the results align with our assumptions and expectations.  From Appendix D, we 
know that PA had the highest number of binned process inputs in 2Q 2012 (PA received 
an equally high value in 1Q 2013 and 3Q 2013 as well but for the sake of simplicity 2Q 
2012 will be utilized) and a zero value in 2Q 2014.  Consequently, if the value of PA is 
changed it is expected that 2Q 2012 would be affected; however, 2Q 2014 would not be 






Figure 53. Minimum PA Weighting  
 
 
Figure 54. Maximum PA Weighting  
This weight testing is then completed for the remaining attributes to verify fidelity 






 NSC Performance Model Accreditation 
Accreditation is the final step in a full M&S VV&A process.  Accreditation is 
used to approve a model or simulation that has demonstrated that it can be employed 
successfully and that its results would be beneficial to the decision-making process.  The 
entire VV&A process, but especially accreditation, would require close work with the 
stakeholders or agency that would be interested in employing the model or simulation.  
For the purposes of our research, we would initially look to market the NSC Performance 
model to the commercial nuclear industry, and perhaps later share the approach with 
other agencies (e.g., INPO, WANO, IAEA).  However, direct interaction with the nuclear 
industry regarding the NSC Performance model has been extremely limited.  It is easy to 
see how the quick visual analyses, sensitivity analyses, and preliminary verification and 
validation of the model would be valuable once the NSC Performance model is deployed 
in vivo with actual data and stakeholders reviewing the results to inform their decisions.  
Future research would be necessary to better understand the sensitivity of the model to 
the selected weights, utilities, and belief degrees selected for the model, but it is easy to 
see how IDS could be useful in producing these analyses.  Further, these sensitivity 
analyses would be invaluable for communicating with participants and stakeholders in a 
NSC Performance model integrated assessment.  As evidenced by this preliminary model 
testing, the NSC Performance model has the potential to integrate degrees of beliefs of 
subject matter experts with binned process input data using an ER model.   
In summary, it has been demonstrated that an integrated assessment methodology, 
based on ER, can be employed to integrate the binned process inputs and degrees of 
belief assessments.  Furthermore, this methodology systematically integrates these data in 
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a meaningful, traceable, and reproducible approach, and provides a ranked NSC 






 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section discusses the summary of the findings, limitations and 
recommendations for future research.  This section will also explain the relevance of this 
research to academia and the implications to engineering managers. 
 
5.1 Implications 
The implications to academia are to expand the current body of knowledge in the 
area of nuclear safety culture health evaluation.  The literature review has expanded the 
body of knowledge by highlighting relevant research literature, and exploring common 
themes, and identifying new conceptual models.  The literature review also exposed the 
considerable gap in the current body of knowledge.  The research presented in this paper 
furthers our understanding on the causal relationship between the process inputs and NSC 
health utilizing MCDA.  This research provides several avenues to expand and bolster 
this area of study. 
The implication to the engineering and project managers is to provide a better 
functional understanding of the relationship between process inputs and NSC utilizing 
MCDA in an operating commercial nuclear power station. 
This research also identified areas of the NSC that had higher significant 
correlations.  This information better equips the manager when deciding on what areas to 
focus on and perhaps most of all allows the manager to have a better actionable insight on 





There are several important limitations that will be discussed in this section.  The 
sample size, while technically acceptable, was low.  Eight respondents answered the 
survey.  A larger sample size in the range of hundreds would make the results more 
generalizable.  The sample size included only one nuclear power station.  It is possible 
that there is bias in the study to one particular industry (i.e., US commercial nuclear 
power stations).  Future research should account for other industrial safety cultures.  The 
survey was self-administered and while self-administered surveys are accepted as a 
standard measurement tool, self-assessment raises concerns of source biases. 
Other important areas for future research are the correlations established between 
aspects of the process inputs and NSC Health.  Research in the specific area of how best 
practices in NSC Health are documented, socialized, and disseminated both within and 
without a nuclear power station would bolster the research presented here. 
5.3 Conclusions 
A literature review on the performance of a nuclear safety culture in an operating 
commercial nuclear power station environment was conducted.  From the review it was 
established that there was a large gap in the body of knowledge.  A conceptual model was 
built, research explored and research questions posed.   
It has been established that quantitative data in the form of Process Inputs, that 
have causality with NSC health, at a nuclear power station can be obtained (Question 1).  
That the degrees of belief of NSC health by leadership at a nuclear power station can be 
quantified for NSC health via a survey (Question 2).  That MCDA can be utilized to 
integrate the degrees of belief of NSC health and the process inputs into a comprehensive 
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methodology to dynamically evaluate NSC Health Performance (Question 3) (Figure 55. 
NSC Assessment Model with MCDA and Figure 56. NSC Assessment Model with 
MCDA (Simplified View).  This research has provided a more objective living NSC 
management tool that provides a management team with NSC health changes 
dynamically.  This can lead to thoughtful discussion and cognitive analysis by the site 
leadership team as to the reason for any changes in the health the NSC. 
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 APPENDIX C: SURRY POWER STATION SCMP MINUTES (EXAMPLE) 
Surry Safety Culture Monitoring Panel 
February 24, 2015 
 
Period Reviewed: October 1 to December 31, 2014 (4Q 2014) 
 
Chairperson: (Supervisor-Organizational Effectiveness T/A) 
 




Summary:  A quorum of qualified SCMP participants was confirmed to be in attendance and the meeting was called to order at 1300. 
One Root Cause Evaluation and one Apparent Cause Evaluation were performed during the fourth quarter of 2014.  These and other required 
materials were reviewed and binned in accordance with LI-AA-1002 (Rev 4), Safety Culture Review, section 3.4, Conduct of SCMP Meetings.  The 
results of this binning activity are recommendations for the Safety Culture Review Team (SCRT) to consider during their quarterly meeting. 
Four of the ten Nuclear Safety Culture (NSC) traits were selected during the binning activity, distributed as follow: 
Six items were binned to Work Processes.  Three items were binned to WP.3 (Documentation), and three were binned to WP.4 (Procedure 
Adherence). 
Three items were binned to Problem Identification and Resolution, with two items binned to PI.2 (Evaluation) and one item binned to PI.3 
(Resolution). 
Two items were binned to Personal Accountability, with both binned to PA.2 (Job Ownership). 
One item was binned to Leadership Safety Values and Actions under LA.5 (Change Management). 
Positive NSC traits were recommended for Questioning Attitude (four instances), as described in the attached binning matrix. 
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The SCMP determined there were no emergent station issues that signaled a decline in station Nuclear Safety Culture focus (ref. LI-AA-1002, 
3.4.2.d) or required immediate attention or action.  No other actions were assigned and the meeting was adjourned. 
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM / PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT 
Root Cause Evaluations (Level 1 and 2) Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s) SCRT Comments 
 
RCE 1128 – Surry Unit 2 Trip:  Unit 2 experienced an automatic reactor trip from 
100% power.  Following the reactor trip troubleshooting determined the source 
of the trip was a spurious opening of the ‘B’ reactor trip breaker. 
 
Root Cause:  Relay terminal screws were tightened “hand tight” (qualitative) 
resulting in inconsistent torque applied to terminal screws. This inconsistency is 





Procedure adherence, (a):  
“Plant activities are governed 
by comprehensive, high-
quality programs, processes, 
and procedures.”  The 
procedure did not include the 
torque value for the relay 
terminal screws. 
 
Apparent Cause Evaluations (Level 1 and 2) Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s) SCRT Comments 
 
ACE 19845 – Evaluate the cause of EDG No. 1 circuit breaker 15H3 remote trip 
and breaker-closed indication failure during performance of 1-OPT-EG-001:  
The EDG #1 circuit breaker, 01-EP-BKR-15H3 EG1 panel breaker-closed 
indication, became lit after the breaker opened during the performance of 1- 
OPT-EG-001 and subsequent tests of the remote trip capability from the EG1 
panel failed to trip open the breaker.  This ACE will determine the most likely 
cause for the failure of conductor 15H3PT1 of cable 1H3PH12. 
 
Apparent Cause:  The EDG No. 1 output circuit breaker control circuit cable 
1H3PH12 conductor 15H3PT1 failed open. The most likely apparent cause of the 
failed conductor is mechanical failure of the conductor due to post installation 
stressors. These stressors are characterized as forces created by sharp bends at 
conduit and penetration entrances and exits, as well as proximity to cable tray 
edges and cable tray cover edges. This apparent cause was previously identified 
by ACE019381 after adjacent cables 1H3PH11 and 1EG89 from the same cable 













Evaluation, (d):  “Extent of 
condition and extent of cause 
evaluations are completed in a 
timely manner, commensurate 
with the safety significance of 
the issue.”  Extent of condition 
evaluation was insufficient. 
 
Resolution, (e):  “Corrective 
actions prevent the recurrence 
of significant conditions 
adverse to quality.”  Corrective 





CAP Trend Report – 4Q 2014 – New Potential Adverse Trends Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s) SCRT Comments 
 
From the trending of condition report trend codes, cause evaluation codes, and 
INPO PO&C codes, Emergency Planning (CR flag trending) and Engineering 
Fundamentals (PO&C Code) were identified as potential adverse trends. 
  






Recommend reviewing after 
CA is complete (2Q2015 








CR570074:  Submitted for Engineering Fundamentals (PO&C Code) 
 
CA response:  There were 3 CRs, in the 4th quarter 2014, with the Primary INPO 
criteria Hot Button, "EN.1 - Engineering Fundamentals (INPO 12-013)."  CR 
570074 is currently being reviewed by engineering. CRs 563897 & 563876 were 
determined by engineering to be department HU clock resets. These two CRs 
were also binned in the Nov 2014 DSEM presentation as Engineering HU 
Fundamental issues and aggregated on the Technical Conscience Bubble Chart 
for the current INPO cycle. The Technical Conscience Bubble Chart for Dec 2014 
shows a negative trend in Engineering Fundamentals for the current INPO cycle.  
Actions to improve engineering performance include plans for additional 





SCMP determined this event 
not to be a nuclear safety 
culture concern. 
 
Nuclear Oversight:  New AFIs, Issues, and Audit Findings Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s) SCRT Comments 
 
AFI 14-007S – Configuration Control:  In some cases, operators performing 
plant activities failed to verify proper component positions or maintain positive 
control of components. This has resulted in the start of a bearing cooling pump 
without a suction source, operation of a circulating water pump without its 
associated screen in service, and inadequate isolation of a train of the low head 













Procedure adherence, (d):  
“Individuals manipulate plant 
equipment only when 
appropriately authorized and 
directed by approved plant 
procedures or work 
instructions.”  Work was not 









Job ownership, (c): 
“Individuals take ownership for 
the preparation and execution 
of assigned work activities” 
was selected as all examples 




AFI 14-010-NBU – SBO Outage Preparation:  In some cases, elements of Fleet 
GaRD MA-AA-DQT-1001, Diesel Quality Team, were not implemented effectively 
during the planning of SBO outages at all three sites in July 2014. Management 
oversight and intrusiveness into the quality of the milestone deliverables and 
enforcement of accountability was lacking in some instances. In addition, 
inconsistent procedure knowledge and adherence was also noted across the 
fleet. Contributing to this, expectations of the new NBU diesel improvement 
initiative have not been effectively communicated from the site leadership team 








Procedure adherence, (a):  
Individuals did not follow 
procedures. 
 
Change management (e):  
Managers did not 




Finding 14-07-01MNS:  Storage Practices utilized for Level D items have not 





Job ownership (c):  Individuals 
did not “take ownership for 
the preparation and execution 
of assigned work activities” 





Finding 14-07-03CMNS:  The basis for selection of Critical Characteristics for 







Documentation (b):  Design 
documentation, procedures, 
and work packages were not 
“complete, thorough, 





Procedure adherence (e):  
Individuals did not “ensure the 
statuses of work activities 
were properly documented.” 
 
 
Finding 14-08-02MNS:  National Academy Nuclear Training (NANT) 
accreditation records are not identified by procedure as QA records and are not 






SCMP determined this legacy 
event not to be a nuclear 




Finding 14-10-01MS:  Qualification requirements for personnel to perform 
concrete and grout activities has not been developed and implemented at 





Documentation, (a):  These 
activities are not “governed by 
a comprehensive, high-quality 




Station Management Review Meeting (SMRM) Open Items and Trends Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s) SCRT Comments 
 
NO new GAPS, Performance Improvement items, or trends were noted during 










SAA32611:   Validate training (PAPII) for FME controls issue.   
SAA32612:  Provide a list and feedback to the Site VP, acting Plant Manager and 
Director of Eng on the Deficient Critical Work Backlog (Non-outage)  
SAA32614:   Revise the Performance Measures and Goals for the GE on the 
packing program  
SAA32615:   Ensure making additions to the RCS are to the top of VCT for 
controlling H2 concentration during reactor startups is proceduralized.  
SAA32616:   Licensing evaluate strategy for readiness for big inspections.  






SCMP determined none of 
these SAA/Action Items were 






SAA32618:  Benchmark Calvert Cliffs on their elimination of TIG welding in FW 
heaters as a method to help with chemistry control of the secondary.  
SAA32619:  Determine how lessons learned from NAPS red KPI on circuit 
breakers was or was not shared with Surry and why Surry’s same KPI is green 
SAA32620:  During benchmarking on configuration control, include review of 
configuration control KPIs 
 
NNOE containing safety culture flag Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s) SCRT Comments 
 








CRs flagged as “Significant Abnormal Unexplained Conditions” Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s) SCRT Comments 
 








Results from Nuclear Safety Culture Assessments, Self-Assessments, 












Human Performance “Good Catches” Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s) SCRT Comments 
 
During a cursory review of a design change (DC) that was not even assigned to 
him, [Engineer] identified that the Current Transformers (CTs) for use in 4160 
volt switchgear were left open-circuited.  This condition would have resulted in 
a catastrophic failure (i.e., explosion) inside the 4kV switchgear and possible arc 
flash that could have led to personal injury or death and a likely loss of the 
entire 4kV bus.  This DC had been fully reviewed by the preparing architect firm 
and the owner’s review completed by Dominion prior to [Engineer] identifying 
the concern.  It was only the extra effort by [Engineer] that prevented this 









While walking down a JPM with an initial License Class Trainee, an operator 
assigned to the Condensate Polishing Water Treatment crew, discovered a 
discrepancy in the actuating solenoid alignment for the unit 2 Emergency 
Switchgear room Halon fire protection system. The system is designed to pump 
in two stages when fire is detected, the second stage 5 minutes after the first. 
He noticed that the actuating solenoids were arranged such that the second 
stage bottle for Zone 2 would dump along with the first stage bottles, thus 
negating the second actuation for that zone. He brought this to the attention of 
shift supervision, Safety & Loss Prevention and Engineering, and it was 
confirmed that this sequence could not positively ensure that the required 
Halon concentration would be maintained in the space for the desired duration. 
This rendered Unit 2 Emergency Switchgear Room Halon system non-functional.  
This Operator’s knowledge of plant systems, his concern over the functionality 
of an installed fire protection system, and his desire to ensure the proper 
response to a deviating condition are prime examples of the ‘K’, ‘N’ and ‘H’ in 






As part of Watchstation Rounds, [Operator] identified that the slinger ring for 
the outboard motor bearing of 1-BC-P-1B was not rotating. She submitted a CR 
and identified the abnormality to Shift Supervision, which allowed for the 
proper research and questions to be asked. 1-BC-P-1A had previously been 
secured due to an upcoming scheduled work package; however, due to [the 
Operator’s] diligence on Watchstation Rounds, the organization decided to 
place 1-BC-P-1A in service again to allow for investigation/repair of 1-BC-P-1B 
before removing 1-BC-P-1A from service. Her attention to detail helped to 








During verification of the tag out for the 50 Ton Chiller, the crew went to verify 
that the component was de-energized and found unexpected voltages. The crew 
contacted their supervisor and Engineering for resolution to the problem. This 
attention to detail and verification process of a protective barrier shows the 











Red or Yellow KPI ERI (6.2) “Age of Red and Yellow Systems” window Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s)  SCRT Comments 
 
SURR01/SURR02, 4Q2014:  The age of R/Y System Health Reports > 18 months: 
EDG 30 months (10 quarters).  One point lost for one system (EDG) being Red / 






SCMP determined this event 






NRC Quarterly Reports and new inspection findings:   Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s) SCRT Comments 
 
Fourth Quarter 2014 NRC Integrated Inspection Report:  An NRC-identified, 
non-cited violation (NCV) of Surry Technical Specification (TS) 6.4, Unit 
Operating Procedures and Programs, Section A.7 was identified because Surry 
procedure 0-ECM-1801-01, “Westinghouse Type BF – BFD – or NBFD65NR Relay 
Replacement” did not include a torque value for the reactor protection system 
(RPS) relay terminal screws to a field wiring connection. Subsequently, Unit 2 
tripped on October 13, 2014, when a field wire connection became loose from 
the terminal end of a RPS trip relay and caused a reactor trip breaker to open. 
The issue was documented in Surry’s corrective action program (CAP) as 






While this issue was covered 
in the RCE binned previously, 
PI.2 (Identification) was added 
because the NRC inspection 
NCV was issued after the RCE 
was complete. 
 
Evaluation, (H):  “Cause 
analyses identify and 
understand the bases for 





MSRC Action Items Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s) SCRT Comments 
 











NEW Operator Work-Arounds and/or Burdens Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s) SCRT Comments 
 
Operator Burden – U1/2 LLIS:  Biological fouling of trash racks, travelling screen 






SCMP determined this not to 






HUMAN RESOURCES & EMPLOYEE CONCERNS (for SCRT review only) 
Human Resources Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s) SCRT Comments 
 
NO INPUT FOR SCMP – SCRT review only 
 
   
 
Generic ECP or SCWE issues Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s) SCRT Comments 
 
NO INPUT FOR SCMP – SCRT review only 
 
   
 
Results of Culture or Organizational Effectiveness Surveys (PI-AA-100-1009) Trait(s) SCMP Recommendation(s) SCRT Comments 
 
NO INPUT FOR SCMP – SCRT review only 
 
   
 
OTHER ITEMS FOR REVIEW 
Other concerns identified by the members including identification of any 
emergent issues 
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 APPENDIX D: NSCMP PROCESS INPUT BINNING RESULTS 



























Quarter PA QA CO LA DM WE CL PI RC WP 
2Q 2012 6 3 1 3 3 1 0 0 0 7 
3Q 2012 3 4 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 
4Q 2012 4 4 0 2 1 0 4 4 0 5 
1Q 2013 6 3 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
2Q 2013 6 5 1 1 1 0 3 1 1 3 
3Q 2013 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 0 5 
4Q 2013 5 2 0 4 1 0 5 0 0 6 
1Q 2014 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 5 
2Q 2014 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 0 2 
3Q 2014 2 1 0 4 1 0 1 1 0 5 
4Q 2014 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 6 
1Q 2015 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 3 





 APPENDIX E: PILOT SURVEY 
 
This pilot survey will be used to validate the proposed survey questions.  The full survey 
is attached.  It is not necessary to answer the actual survey questions.  Please read through 
the question and answer the review section for that particular question.  The review 
section contains 5 columns.  For the first 4 columns, please place an “X” in the box(s) 
that are most appropriate.  Each question has a place for comments on that question in the 
last column labeled “Recommendations/Assessment”.  Additionally, at the end of the 
survey there is a general comments section.  This section can be used to address the 
survey in general or specific survey questions.  If commenting on survey questions please 
refer to the survey question number.  The survey will be revised based on the inputs from 
the pilot survey responses and posted on an on-line survey service.  The survey will be 
sent out to multiple individuals in multiple organizations that work in a nuclear power 





The information being requested will help academics and companies better understand 
health of a nuclear safety culture in a nuclear power station environment.  Analysis of the 
results will be based on a combination of survey participants and cannot be traced back to 
any one individual, event, or company.  Individual responses will remain anonymous and 
will not be reported to any person or entity.  Individual responses will not be traced back 
to any one individual, event, or company.  Participation in this survey is voluntary, with 
no penalties or reprisals for not participating or completing the survey.  Please read 





Nuclear Safety Culture: 
The core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and 
individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and 
the environment. 
 
Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (SCMP): 
Consists of key site personnel that meet periodically to review station performance and 
bin events and trends to the Traits for a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture.  The primary 
function of the SCMP is to periodically assess nuclear safety culture trends and identify 
potential trends and/or emergent issues then roll those up to the Safety Culture Review 
Team. 
 
Nuclear Safety Monitoring Panel (NSCMP) Binning: 
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The NSCMP reviews the inputs most indicative of the health of the nuclear safety culture 
(e.g., Corrective Action Program, Regulatory Communications, Self Assessments, etc.) to 
identify potential concerns that merit additional attention by the organization. These 
inputs are then binned in one or more of the Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture. 
 
Safety Culture Review Team (SCRT): 
This is the management team that reviews the results of the SCMP and takes corrective 
actions to address trends in the safety culture.  The primary function of the SCRT is to 
monitor and promote a healthy nuclear safety culture by conducting a reflective self-
critique of information that reflects the health of the Station’s safety culture. 
 
1. My years of experience as a member of a Nuclear Safety Culture Review Team and/or 
Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 1: 
 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











2. My position at this power station would most accurately be classified as? 
  
Drop down menu with: Manager or above, Supervisor (Titled) or 
Non-management. 
 
          
 
Review of Question 2: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 













3. My years of experience working in Military Nuclear Power Plants? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 3: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











4. My years of experience working in Commercial Nuclear Power Plants? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 4: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 










Individual Commitment to Safety: includes – 
PA.  Personal Accountability  
All individuals take personal responsibility for safety.  Responsibility and authority for 
nuclear safety are well defined and clearly understood.  Reporting relationships, 
positional authority, and team responsibilities emphasize the overriding importance of 
nuclear safety.  
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QA.  Questioning Attitude  
Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions, 
assumptions, anomalies, and activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result 
in error or inappropriate action.  All employees are watchful for assumptions, values, 
conditions, or activities that can have an undesirable effect on plant safety.  
CO.  Safety Communication  
Communications maintain a focus on safety.  Safety communication is broad and 
includes plant-level communication, job-related communication, worker-level 
communication, equipment labeling, operating experience, and documentation.  Leaders 
use formal and informal communication to convey the importance of safety.  The flow of 
information up the organization is seen as important as the flow of information down the 
organization. 
 
Management Commitment to Safety includes: 
LA.  Leadership Accountability 
Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors.  Executive 
and senior managers are the leading advocates of nuclear safety and demonstrate their 
commitment both in word and action.  The nuclear safety message is communicated 
frequently and consistently, occasionally as a stand-alone theme. Leaders throughout the 
nuclear organization set an example for safety.  Corporate policies emphasize overriding 
importance of nuclear safety.  
DM. Decision-Making  
Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are systematic, rigorous, and thorough. 
Operators are vested with the authority and understand the expectation, when faced with 
unexpected or uncertain conditions, to place the plant in a safe condition. Senior leaders 
support and reinforce conservative decisions.  
WE. Respectful Work Environment  
Trust and respect permeate the organization, creating a respectful work environment. A 
high level of trust is established in the organization, fostered, in part, through timely and 
accurate communication.  Differing professional opinions are encouraged, discussed, and 
resolved in a timely manner.  Employees are informed of steps taken in response to their 
concerns.  
 
Management Systems includes: 
CL. Continuous Learning  
Opportunities to continuously learn are valued, sought out, and implemented. Operating 
experience is highly valued, and the capacity to learn from experience is well developed. 
Training, self-assessments, and benchmarking are used to stimulate learning and improve 
performance.  Nuclear safety is kept under constant scrutiny through a variety of 
monitoring techniques, some of which provide an independent “fresh look.”  
PI. Problem Identification and Resolution 
Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly 
addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance.  Identification and 
resolution of a broad spectrum of problems, including organizational issues, are used to 
strengthen safety and improve performance.  
RC. Environment for Raising Concerns  
191 
 
A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) is maintained where personnel feel free to 
raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or 
discrimination.  The station creates, maintains, and evaluates policies and processes that 
allow personnel to freely raise concerns.  
WP. Work Processes  
The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety is 
maintained.  Work management is a deliberate process in which work is identified, 
selected, planned, scheduled, executed, closed, and critiqued. The entire organization is 
involved in and fully supports the process.  
All questions pertain to an operating nuclear power station that has no emergent 
conditions present.  
 
Individual Commitment to Safety 
 
5. Approximately how many items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety would 
indicate complete integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 5: 
 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











6. Approximately how many items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety would 
indicate significant integration but not complete integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture 
into normal operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 6: 
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 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











7. Approximately how many items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety would 
indicate an average level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal 
operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 7: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











8. Approximately how many items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety would 
indicate a minimal level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal 
operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 8: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 













9. Approximately how many items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety would 
indicate the absence of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 9: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











10. Approximately how many items binned under Management Commitment to Safety would 
indicate complete integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 10: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











11. Approximately how many items binned under Management Commitment to Safety would 
indicate significant integration but not complete integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture 
into normal operations? 
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  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 11: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 










12. Approximately how many items binned under Management Commitment to Safety would 
indicate an average level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal 
operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 12: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











13. Approximately how many items binned under Management Commitment to Safety would 
indicate a minimal level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal 
operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 13: 
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 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











14. Approximately how many items binned under Management Commitment to Safety would 
indicate an absence of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 14: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











15. Approximately how many items binned under Management Systems would indicate 
complete integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 15: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 













16. Approximately how many items binned under Management Systems would indicate 
significant integration but not complete integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into 
normal operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 16: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











17. Approximately how many items binned under Management Systems would indicate an 
average level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?  
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 17: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











18. Approximately how many items binned under Management Systems would indicate a 
minimal level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?  




          
 
Review of Question 18: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











19. Approximately how many items binned under Management Systems would indicate an 
absence of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 19: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 










20. Approximately how many total items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety, 
Management Commitment to Safety and Management Systems would indicate complete 
integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 20: 
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 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











21. Approximately how many total items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety, 
Management Commitment to Safety and Management Systems would indicate significant 
integration but not complete integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal 
operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 21: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











22. Approximately how many total items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety, 
Management Commitment to Safety and Management Systems would indicate an 
average level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?  
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 22: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 













23. Approximately how many total items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety, 
Management Commitment to Safety and Management Systems would indicate a minimal 
level of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations?  
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 23: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 











24. Approximately how many total items binned under Individual Commitment to Safety, 
Management Commitment to Safety and Management Systems would indicate an 
absence of integration of the Nuclear Safety Culture into normal operations? 
  Drop down menu with: 0,1,2,3….48,49,50+ 
 
          
 
Review of Question 24: 
 Question is 
clear/under
standable  
Question is NOT 
clear/understandable 










GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE SURVEY: 
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• Old Dominion University, 2015, Major: Engineering Management, Degree: Ph.D. 
• Liberty University, 2007, Major: Leadership, Degree: M.B.A. 
• Excelsior College, 2003, Major: Technology (E/I T), Degree: B.S. 
 
Licensures and Certifications 
• Professional Engineer License (PE) (VA) 
• Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) Certification (Surry Power Station) 
• National Academy for Nuclear Training (NANT) Instructor Certification 
 
Honors and Awards 
• Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Strength Awards 2003 and 2008 
• Training Top Industry Practice (TIP) Award, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 2003.   
• Training Excellence Award, American Nuclear Society (ANS), April 1995 
• U.S. Navy Commendation Medal, Secretary of the Navy, Department of the Navy  
 
Association Memberships 
• American Society for Engineering Management (ASEM) January 2014 to Present 
• Golden Key International Honour Society (ODU/VCU Chapters) 2008 to Present 
• The American Legion 2000 to Present 
• International Society of Automation (ISA) (Senior Member) 1986 to Present 
 
Professional Experience 
2004 – Present, Project Manager/Supervisor/Engineer – Surry Power Station. 
 
Teaching Experience 
1986 - 2004, Instructor and Chair, I&C and Licensed Operator Requalification 
Programs, National Academy for Nuclear Training (SPS Branch) 
 
Military Experience 




• Simulation Provides Insight and Training at Surry Nuclear Power Station, Visual 
Solutions Inc. December 12, 2000 
• Computer-based simulations that provide dynamic analysis of process control 
fundamentals.  The Nuclear Professional, INPO October 23, 1996  
 
Conference Presentations 
Multi-Criteria Analysis Investigation for Seismic Modifications in Nuclear Power 
Plants. The 6th International Conference of Management and Industrial Engineering 
October 31, 2013 Authors: James H. Warren, Jr. P.E., Adrian Gheorghe 
